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The Regulation of Race in Science
Kimani Paul-Emile*
ABSTRACT
The overwhelming majority of biological scientists agree that there is no
such thing as race among modern humans.  Yet, scientists regularly deploy
race in their studies, and federal laws and regulations currently mandate the
use of racial categories in biomedical research.  Legal commentators have
tried to make sense of this paradox primarily by looking to equal protection
strict scrutiny analysis.  However, the colorblind approach that attends this
doctrine—which many regard as synonymous with invalidation—does not of-
fer a particularly useful way to think about the use of race in research.  It
offers no way to address how current uses of race in science serve to reinforce
biological notions of race long thought discarded.  This Article, therefore,
takes a different approach by shifting the debate from how strict scrutiny anal-
ysis can bear on race-based research, to asking a much deeper question: What
normative aims motivate this jurisprudence and can they be instructive in
mapping appropriate and equality-enhancing regulations for the use of race in
biomedical research?  Despite the Supreme Court’s apparent discomfort with
government invocations of race, this Article locates in its equal protection race
cases elements of an overlooked line of analysis that this Article terms “racial
pragmatism,” according to which certain government race-conscious decision-
making will not trigger strict scrutiny review.  By parsing through the Court’s
recent race cases, this Article identifies the goals and concerns that accompany
racial pragmatist reasoning and brings them to bear in the biomedical research
context to offer a framework for how regulators can mandate the use of race
in research without dangerously “geneticizing” race.
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INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented sequencing of the human genome in 2000 re-
vealed the incredible genetic similarity among humans and prompted
President Clinton to announce that “one of the great truths to emerge
from this triumphant expedition inside the human genome is that in
genetic terms all human beings, regardless of race, are more than 99.9
percent the same.”1  As a result of this leap in scientific knowledge,
today, the overwhelming majority of biological scientists agree that
“among modern humans, there’s no such thing as race.”2
1 White House Remarks on Decoding of Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at F8.
2 See Gail Dutton, Correlating Genomics, Race, and Medicine, GENETIC ENGINEERING
NEWS, Jan. 1, 2006, at 1 (quoting Joseph L. Graves, Jr., Ph.D., Dean of University Studies and
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At the same time that many people are heralding the demise of
race as a biological or genetic category, the notion of racial difference
has taken on a particular salience in biomedical research.  The Na-
tional Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 (“NIH Revitali-
zation Act”)3 requires the documentation of research subjects’ race in
federally financed clinical studies and the use of racial categories as
variables in such research.4  The Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) has issued similar guidelines, which, taken together, form a
comprehensive mandate to use racial categories in biomedical re-
search.5  As a result, today, biomedical researchers use racial catego-
ries in their studies in ways that make race appear biological or
genetic, which raises disturbing legal and health policy concerns, jeop-
ardizes individual and public health, harms racial minority popula-
tions, and reifies outmoded, pejorative, and stigmatizing notions of
racial difference.6  For example, when researchers seek to conduct
studies or test drugs on a group of people who are similar genetically,
they might use race as a rough approximation of geographic ancestry.7
Despite the fact that race is an imperfect proxy for geographic origin,
the information yielded from this crude estimate is increasingly being
used in the formulation of race-specific drugs and therapeutics, which
raises profoundly troubling public health issues.8  Thus, in ways that
Professor of Biological Sciences, North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University); see
also infra note 67; Lab Suspends DNA Pioneer Watson, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
science/nature/7052416.stm (last updated Oct. 19, 2007) (according to Dr. Craig Venter, among
the first to map the human genome, “[s]kin colour as a surrogate for race is a social concept[,]
not a scientific one”).
3 National Institutes of Health (NIH) Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107
Stat. 122.
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 289a-2 (2006).
5 Investigational New Drug Applications and New Drug Applications, Final Rule, 63 Fed.
Reg. 6,854, 6,854–55 (Feb. 11, 1998) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 312, 314) (requiring that analyses
of effectiveness and safety data for important demographic subgroups, including race, be in-
cluded in New Drug Applications and that enrollment of subjects in clinical studies for drug and
biological products be documented by demographic subgroups in investigational new drug an-
nual reports).
6 See infra Part I.B–D.
7 As discussed by Professors Erik Lillquist and Charles Sullivan, to the extent that they
are representative of geographic origin, racial categories are far too broad to be helpful to medi-
cal research.  Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in
Medicine, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 425-26 (2004).  Rather, more dramatic genetic varia-
tions are shown between people who are members of separate, more localized population
groups: “most genetic differences are really differences between population groups, rather than
between races.” Id.
8 See generally Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes “Ethnic”: Law, Commerce, and the
Production of Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2004)
(discussing the development of the drug BiDil).
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few have predicted, the passage of federal laws and regulations that
require the use of race in biomedical studies has contributed to the
reification of race as a biological category in research.
The irony of this reinstantiation of biological race at a time when
many are celebrating its demise has not been lost on legal scholars.  A
sustained and heated debate about the ways in which the law can be
mobilized to regulate the new uses of race in the biomedical sciences
is being waged in the literature.9  The primary framework used in
these scholarly discussions has been that of strict scrutiny.10  While re-
liance on this analytical framework makes sense given the Supreme
Court’s treatment of race under the Equal Protection Clause, to the
extent that strict scrutiny review has become synonymous with invali-
dation, this scholarship offers little guidance on how to address fully
the complex issues raised by new uses of race in biomedical research.
Further, by relying on strict scrutiny, this scholarship offers an incom-
plete answer to the preliminary question of how regulators and jurists
should think about race.
This Article, therefore, takes a different approach.  It constructs a
normative analysis of how race should be employed in the biomedical
research context by examining the aims and principles that undergird
equal protection strict scrutiny jurisprudence.  Rather than apply strict
scrutiny analysis in a rote fashion, as is often done in scholarship on
the use of race in biomedical research, this Article instead reorients
discussion from the formal elements of the Supreme Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence (e.g., scrutiny, racial classifications, compel-
ling interests, etc.) to ask a much deeper question: What overarching
objectives motivate this jurisprudence and the Court’s concern about
government uses of race?  And, can this be instructive in devising ap-
9 See, e.g., OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, CTR. FOR GENETICS & SOC’Y, PLAYING THE GENE
CARD?: A REPORT ON RACE AND HUMAN BIOTECHNOLOGY (2009); Stacie E. Geller et al., Ad-
herence to Federal Guidelines for Reporting of Sex and Race/Ethnicity in Clinical Trials, 15 J. OF
WOMEN’S HEALTH 1123 (2006); Jonathan Kahn, Race-ing Patents/Patenting Race: An Emerging
Political Geography of Intellectual Property in Biotechnology, 92 IOWA L. REV. 353 (2007);
Michael Laufert, Race and Population-Based Medicine: Drug Development and Distributive Jus-
tice, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 859 (2008); Lilliquist & Sullivan, supra note 7; Winnie W.S. Mak
et al., Gender and Ethnic Diversity in NIMH-Funded Clinical Trials: Review of a Decade of
Published Research, 34 ADMIN. & POL’Y IN MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 497 (2007); Osagie K. Obasogie, Beyond Best Practices: Strict Scrutiny as a Regulatory
Model for Race-Specific Medicines, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 491 (2008); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Legal Constraints on the Use of Race in Biomedical Research: Toward a Social Justice Frame-
work, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 526 (2006); Symposium, Race, Pharmaceuticals, and Medical Tech-
nology, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 443 (2008).
10 See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 461–65; Obasogie, supra note 9, at 494–96;
Roberts, supra note 9, at 529–30.
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propriate and equality-enhancing regulations for the new uses of race
in biomedical research?  Thus, this Article shifts the debate in the
literature on the use of race in biomedical research from the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny analysis to a different reading of the doctrine,
which this Article terms “racial pragmatism.”
This Article positions racial pragmatism as an unexamined strain
of analysis employed by jurists in equal protection race cases that al-
lows for certain race-conscious decisionmaking by state actors.11  Ra-
cial pragmatism holds that although race lacks a genetic or biological
foundation, it is, nevertheless, “real” to the extent that after centuries
of institutionalized, state-approved racial discrimination, race has a
palpability and a salience in some contexts that cannot and should not
be ignored.  As a result, according to racial pragmatist reasoning, cer-
tain race-conscious decisionmaking by state actors is necessary to ac-
count for the social significance of race and will, therefore, not trigger
strict scrutiny review.
Jurists’ reliance upon racial pragmatist reasoning illuminates the
normative contours of what many legal scholars have identified as the
Supreme Court’s discomfort with invocations of racial categories and
the “colorblind” ideology animating its equal protection jurispru-
dence.  Indeed, although there is a strong colorblindness norm embed-
ded in the Court’s modern equal protection doctrine, it is neither as
coherent nor unwavering as the Court suggests.  This flexibility is cap-
tured by racial pragmatism.  The racial pragmatist approach employed
by some Justices and other jurists has enabled them to carve out of the
prevailing colorbindness paradigm a pragmatic understanding of the
salience of race.  Jurists’ adoption of racial pragmatist reasoning dem-
onstrates that even those who generally embrace a colorblindness
norm are occasionally concerned about the potential real-world im-
pact of this approach and recognize that there is harm in taking color-
blindness to its logical end or in following the concept down the
proverbial rabbit hole.  As a result, a number of jurists and a minority
of justices who ordinarily accept colorblindness have at times dis-
tanced themselves from this approach as a practical matter, favoring
instead a more pragmatic understanding of the salience of race.
Although some jurists who engage in racial pragmatist reasoning
might find race consciousness normatively objectionable but occasion-
ally necessary to account for the social significance of race, this Article
contends, by contrast, that race consciousness is critically important
11 See infra Part II.C.
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and inescapably necessary because race is socially significant.  Thus,
this Article asserts that race should be used as a variable in biomedical
research to account for its social—not biological—salience and dem-
onstrates how racial pragmatist reasoning regarding the social rele-
vance of race can be used to create guidelines to accomplish this goal.
Ultimately, this Article seeks to transform the ways in which the regu-
lation of race in biomedical research is conceptualized so that it is
more attentive to equality and racial justice concerns.
By parsing through various Supreme Court race cases examining
questions of equal protection, this Article identifies the factors and
themes that appear to weigh upon whether a particular invocation of
race will be examined by courts under a racial pragmatist perspective
and be deemed presumptively appropriate, or will be analyzed
through a colorblindness lens and be considered a constitutionally sus-
pect “racial classification” deserving of equal protection strict scrutiny
review.  This Article then applies the principles that undergird racial
pragmatism to the biomedical research context.  In so doing, it exam-
ines how biomedical researchers employ racial categories in their
studies in ways that harm minority populations and reinforce perni-
cious, antiquated, and stigmatizing conceptions of racial difference.
This is precisely the type of harm that most concerns the Court in its
equal protection jurisprudence.  There are, however, some uses of
race in research that hold tremendous promise for alleviating the
longstanding health disparities that exist among racial groups.  These
uses of race must be preserved.  This Article, by identifying the goals
and concerns that drive the Court’s racial pragmatist approach and
bringing them to bear in the biomedical research context, offers a
framework for how regulators can mandate the use of race in research
without dangerously “biologizing” or “geneticizing” race.  This frame-
work would, at the same time, still enable regulators to effectively
protect the integrity of scientific research, safeguard minority health,
ensure the efficacy of government public health measures, and guar-
antee the viability of government attempts to address the social and
economic inequities that cleave along racial lines.
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I chronicles the origin of
race in research and examines the role that race has played in the
modern regulation of human-subjects research.  This Part then exam-
ines the events and concerns that prompted Congress to enact the
NIH Revitalization Act and the FDA to devise its rules on the use of
race in clinical trials.  Part II sets forth the problematic ways in which
racial categories are currently deployed in biomedical studies and
2012] THE REGULATION OF RACE IN SCIENCE 1121
maps the dangers that attend the use of race in research, beginning
with an examination of the modern use of race in pharmaceutical drug
development.
Part III commences by presenting the ongoing debate among
scholars about the appropriate regulation of, and the extent to which
equal protection strict scrutiny analysis can inform the use of, race in
biomedical research.  This Part then offers an alternative perspective:
racial pragmatism.  With an eye toward expanding our understanding
of how courts actually conceive of race across legal regimes, Part III
engages in a textual analysis of various race cases to delineate the
principles that influence whether a particular state invocation of race
will be examined by courts under a racial pragmatist perspective and
be deemed constitutionally acceptable, or will be examined according
to a colorblind approach that triggers strict scrutiny analysis.  In so
doing, this Part probes the parameters of the Court’s recent turn to-
ward colorblindness and demonstrates the extent to which the Court’s
modern approach to equal protection doctrine includes racial pragma-
tism.  This Part focuses on the Court’s education, voting rights, and
criminal suspect identification jurisprudence.
Part IV offers a new way of thinking about the regulation of race
in biomedical research by integrating into this context a discrete set of
principles and themes culled from courts’ racial pragmatist reasoning
examined in Part III.  Part IV asserts that race should be used as a
variable in biomedical research to account for its social, not biological,
significance, and, relying upon racial pragmatist reasoning, demon-
strates how this can be accomplished in a way that preserves the integ-
rity of scientific research, promotes public health, and allows
regulators to achieve racial justice in and through biomedical
research.
I. RACE IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
The turn of the millennium has brought with it an unparalleled
increase in medical research involving human subjects.12  The veritable
explosion of biomedical innovations, including the sequencing of the
human genome and pharmacokinetics, as well as improved under-
standings of microbiology, biochemistry, molecular biology, and the
progression of disease, has led to an unprecedented growth in bi-
12 See Barbara A. Noah, The Participation of Underrepresented Minorities in Clinical Re-
search, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 221 (2003).
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omedical research studies.13  It has also raised many questions about
how race should be regulated in this context.
Biomedical research includes a number of different methodologi-
cal approaches, including epidemiology, clinical studies, patient case
histories, and DNA database genetic research.14  Although race is im-
plicated in virtually all biomedical research, the use of racial catego-
ries in clinical studies has historically raised unique and difficult
concerns.15
Clinical research applies natural science research principles, par-
ticularly biology and chemistry, to medical practice in order to ex-
amine the underlying biochemical causes of diseases (“clinical
studies”) or to evaluate the efficacy of a medication or treatment, such
as a medical device (“clinical trials”).16  While clinical studies examine
disease onset and progression, clinical trials compare a medication or
treatment to other medicines or treatments, a placebo, or the standard
course of treatment for the patient’s condition or disease.17  Some
clinical studies offer the possibility of therapeutic benefits to research
participants, while others are conducted primarily to increase and im-
prove scientific knowledge and are not curative or remedial.18
Some approaches to medical research, such as epidemiology, use
racial categories descriptively in statistical or quantitative analyses to
evaluate the causes and prevalence of diseases within and across
populations.19  Clinical research, by contrast, often uses race as a bio-
logical or genetic category in evaluating disease onset, progression,
and severity, as well as drug or treatment response.20  For this reason,
the use of race in clinical research has raised unique concerns and
opportunities for abuse that do not arise when race is deployed in
other types of biomedical research.  This Part examines government
efforts to regulate the misuses and abuses of race in clinical research,
and begins by chronicling the early uses of race in research that
prompted the need for regulatory intervention.
13 See id.
14 Erik Lillquist & Charles Sullivan, Legal Regulation of the Use of Race in Medical Re-
search, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 535, 536 (2006).
15 See id.; Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 461–65.
16 3 NAT’L INST. HEALTH BIENNIAL REP. 109–10 (2008–2009), http://report.nih.gov/bien-
nialreport/pdf/NIH_Biennial_FY0809_Volume_III.pdf
17 Id.
18 Noah, supra note 12, at 222.
19 See Raj Bhopal, Race and Ethnicity: Responsible Use from Epidemiological and Public
Health Perspectives, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 500, 501 (2006).
20 See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 461–65.
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A. The Origin of Race in Research
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Western Euro-
pean researchers in the fields of anatomy, biology, and physiology be-
gan employing empirical methods to study and create taxonomies of
humanity.  In 1735, for example, the Swedish biologist Carolus Lin-
naeus devised a system of classification that divided humans into four
categories defined by skin color, geographic ancestry, and personality
traits: Africanus (black skin, lazy, careless, carefree), Americanus (red
skin, obstinate, ill-tempered), Asiaticus (yellow skin, greedy, dis-
tractible), and Eurpoeaus (white skin, innovative and intelligent).21
Similarly, in 1781, the physiologist and founder of modern anthropol-
ogy, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, extended Linnaeus’s system by
using his “scientific” theories to demonstrate “objectively” that Afri-
cans were biologically, psychologically, and morally inferior to
Europeans.22
These pseudoscientific theories were readily accepted in the
United States.  During the 1840s and 1850s, some well-respected U.S.
scientists began refining these theories by measuring, tabulating,
quantifying, and classifying perceived differences among humans in an
effort to prove that people of color constituted biologically distinct
and inferior species, as opposed to their previous designation as mem-
bers of “less developed” cultures.23  One of the most prominent of
these scientists was the internationally renowned Harvard professor
Louis Agassiz, who posited that the races emerged from separate ori-
gins and were inherently unequal.24  Another scientist widely recog-
nized for applying empirical methods to the study of human difference
was the famed phrenologist Dr. Samuel George Morton, who mea-
sured the cranial capacity of over eight hundred skulls found through-
out the world to produce evidence of the inferiority of nonwhite
peoples.25  According to Morton’s findings, the most highly ranked
peoples were the Caucasians, who had the largest skulls and therefore
21 WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 9 (1994);
Christian B. Sundquist, The Meaning of Race in the DNA Era: Science, History, and the Law, 27
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 231, 234–35 (2008); see also WILLIAM STANTON, THE LEOP-
ARD’S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA, 1815–59, at 3 (1960).
22 TUCKER, supra note 21, at 9.  Blumenbach also coined the term “Caucasian,” which he
deemed to be the ultimate race. Id.
23 See id. at 17–21.
24 See id.
25 See id.
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the “highest intellectual endowments.”26  Much lower down the scale
were American Indians, who were “averse to cultivation,” and at the
very bottom were “Ethiopians,” as blacks were known at the time,
who he deemed “the lowest grade of humanity.”27
Although history has shown that the work of the “race scientists”
was shaped by then-popular pejorative perceptions of race and their
own prejudices,28 their research was nevertheless widely celebrated
for its seeming commitment to objectivity and the presumed unbiased
use of scientific methods.29  These scientific findings regarding the
“natural” inferiority of blacks were also reflected in the caselaw of the
time, including the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford30 decision, in
which the Supreme Court declared that African Americans were
“considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who . . . had
no rights or privileges” and therefore were not entitled to the rights
and privileges of citizenship or full protection under the
Constitution.31
The research of race scientists and its effects continued through
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as biologists applied Charles
26 See id. at 18–19 (citing Samuel George Morton, CRANIA AMERICANA 5–7, 54, 65, 93
(1839)).
27 See id.
28 The famed scientist Stephen J. Gould attempted to recreate Morton’s research on
human skulls and deemed the studies to be “a patchwork of fudging and finagling in the clear
interest of controlling a priori convictions.” STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN
65, 54 (1981).  Moreover, it has been noted by historians that most of the Caucasian skulls that
Morton studied belonged to executed felons, and therefore a large skull could just have easily
represented criminality. See THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN
AMERICA 74 (1963).  Similarly, although Louis Agassiz claimed that his work on racial difference
was disinterested and nonpolitical, in his first major article on race he justified his efforts by
proclaiming that the fact that “the submissive, obsequious, imitative negro” exhibited a “peculiar
indifference to the advantages afforded by civilized society” forced him to conclude that “human
affairs with reference to the colored races would be far more judiciously conducted, if, in our
intercourse with them, we were guided by a full consciousness of the real differences existing
between us and them, and a desire to foster those dispositions that are eminently marked in
them, rather than by treating them on terms of equality.” TUCKER, supra note 21, at 17–18.
29 See TUCKER, supra note 21, at 17.  The work of these scientists was also readily accepted
by jurists, including the Justices in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) and
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as well as those who sought to maintain the prosperity
and political power of Southern states, because this research provided empirical support for their
arguments that as a subhuman species, Africans and their descendants were exempt from the
Declaration of Independence’s “self-evident” truth “that all men are created equal.” See Plessy,
163 U.S. at 551–52; Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 410–11; see generally STANTON, supra note
21; TUCKER, supra note 21.
30 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
31 See id. at 404–05, 454.
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Darwin’s notion of natural selection to humanity,32 giving rise to what
became known as “Social Darwinism.”33  This social theory used Dar-
win’s hypotheses to justify its “survival of the fittest” approach to race
and class distinctions, and maintained that social programs aimed at
elevating the status of the poor and racial minorities contradicted the
natural balance.34  Social Darwinist philosophies would ultimately
lead to the advent of the eugenics movement, which was largely re-
sponsible for the passage of antimiscegenation laws, Jim Crow segre-
gation policies, immigration restrictions, and the forced sterilization of
an estimated forty-five thousand people of “inferior stock” in the
United States alone.35
Despite the sordid early history of the use of race in science,
throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries, research-
ers have continued to misuse and abuse race in research.  In response,
state and federal governments have enacted laws and policies to po-
lice the way researchers deploy racial categories in their studies.
Those federal regulatory efforts, including the NIH Revitalization Act
and FDA rules, are addressed in the next section.
B. The Regulation of Race in Research
During the mid-1980s, medical researchers began conducting
clinical trials to determine the efficacy of the drug zidovudine
(“AZT”) in treating HIV/AIDS, a deadly and virulent disease for
which there was no known standard of treatment at the time.36  A con-
troversy subsequently arose over the constitution of the drug trials as
32 See generally CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL
SELECTION (J. Carroll ed., Broadview Press 2003) (1859).  Darwin maintained that all humans
belonged to one species and cautioned that his work should not be used to create hierarchies of
human beings.  According to Darwin: “Although the existing races of man differ in many re-
spects, as in color, hair, shape of skull, proportions of the body, etc., yet if their whole structure
be taken into consideration they are found to resemble each other closely in a multitude of
points.  Many of these points are of so unimportant or of so singular a nature, that it is extremely
improbable that they should have been independently acquired by aboriginally distinct species
or races.” CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 203
(reprinted from 2d Eng. ed., rev. and augmented 1874).
33 See Troy Duster, Lessons from History: Why Race and Ethnicity Have Played a Major
Role in Biomedical Research, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 487, 490–91 (2006).
34 Sundquist, supra note 21, at 243.  The term “survival of the fittest” was coined by Social
Darwinist Herbert Spencer, who, according to Professor Troy Duster, “dominated the social
thought of his age as few have ever done.”  Duster, supra note 33, at 490–91.
35 Sundquist, supra note 21, at 242–46.
36 Charles Weijer, Evolving Ethical Issues in Selection of Subjects for Clinical Research, 5
CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 334, 338 (1996).
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studies revealed that most of the research subjects were white men.37
Critics charged that the homogeneity of the research population de-
nied members of other demographic groups, such as women and racial
minorities, the benefits of this and other types of clinical research.38
This demand for broader involvement in clinical trials as a means
of expanding the pool of those who might enjoy the advantages of
such research was a stark departure from the previous twenty years,
when the focus had not been on the fair distribution of research bene-
fits, but rather on the fair distribution of research risks.39  Indeed, until
the late twentieth century, the risks attendant to clinical research had
been borne disproportionately by people of color and members of dis-
advantaged or vulnerable groups.40
Attitudes towards clinical research practices first began to change
in 1971, when the media exposed a forty-year clinical study sponsored
by the U.S. Public Health Service, in which nearly four hundred Afri-
can American men with syphilis were systematically denied known,
effective treatments and were not informed that their treatments were
37 Id. at 338–39; see also Noah, supra note 12, at 226 (“In 1996, only twenty-three percent
of participants in HIV medication trials were African-American, a markedly low participation
rate relative to the incidence of the disease in this population.”).
38 See Leslie A. Meltzer & James F. Childress, What Is Fair Participant Selection?, in THE
OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 377, 378–79 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al.
eds., 2008).  In addition, intravenous drug users were categorically excluded from these pharma-
ceutical trials, and the studies included very low percentages of minorities, women of childbear-
ing age, prostitutes, prisoners, and infants, all of whom could have benefitted from participating
in these early studies. Id. at 379.
39 Id. at 378.
40 See JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE 255 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that pressure to strengthen protections for research subjects
in the 1970s arose from revelations about “the use of vulnerable populations: developmentally
disabled children, elderly persons, and members of disadvantaged minority groups”); Henry K.
Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354, 1355–59 (1966) (chronicling
twenty-two clinical trials that involved “unethical or questionably ethical procedures” that had
been conducted on institutionalized, mentally disabled children; hospital patients; the elderly;
and the terminally ill in either university, or state or federally funded facilities).  The resulting
research results were published in eminent medical journals. See Meltzer & Childress, supra
note 38, at 377.  Other unethical research conducted on racial minorities has included: a study in
the 1990s that provided lead-contaminated housing to low-income, minority families with
healthy children so that researchers could measure the effect of abatement methods on the levels
of lead that accumulated in the children’s blood, see Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782
A.2d 807, 812–16 (Md. 2001); studies in the 1960s of the effects of massive doses of radiation,
performed on mostly low-income African American cancer patients, see In re Cincinnati Radia-
tion Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 800–01 (S.D. Ohio 1995); medical studies in the 1950s on the effect
of radiation on unprotected Navajo uranium miners, see Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1059,
1060–62 (9th Cir. 1985); and surgery conducted on female slaves in the 1800s without anesthesia,
see Machelle Allen, The Dilemma for Women of Color in Clinical Trials, 49 J. AM. MED. WO-
MEN’S ASS’N 105, 106 (1994).
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not diagnostic, but were instead done for research purposes.41  Al-
though this study, known as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, was broadly
condemned on many ethical grounds, the predominant critique cen-
tered on the race-based selection of research participants, who were
chosen based upon the mistaken belief that syphilis was a different
disease in white people than in black people.42
Public outrage over this and other exploitative, nonconsensual re-
search prompted Congress to enact the National Research Act of
1974,43 which established the National Commission for the Protection
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (“Com-
mission”).44  The Commission took a protectionist stance on the selec-
tion of research participants and advised researchers to distinguish
between possible research participants “based on the ability of mem-
bers of that class to bear burdens and on the appropriateness of plac-
ing further burdens on already burdened persons.”45  In 1981, the
Department of Health and Human Services and the FDA issued simi-
lar regulations that required institutional review boards to ensure that
the “selection of subjects is equitable.”46
41 See BERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 255.  The Tuskegee Syphilis Study began in 1930 and
concluded during the 1970s, well after penicillin became available to treat the disease. Id.  For
more information about the study, see FRED D. GRAY, THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY: THE
REAL STORY AND BEYOND (1998); JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS
EXPERIMENT (1981); William J. Curran, The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 730
(1973); Larry I. Palmer, Paying for Suffering: The Problem of Human Experimentation, 56 MD.
L. REV. 604 (1997); Robert M. White, Unraveling the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis, 160
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 585 (2000).
42 Meltzer & Childress, supra note 38, at 377; see also Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Re-
search: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21, 22 (1978) (discuss-
ing the opinions of physicians that “blacks [were] especially prone to venereal diseases”).
43 National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342.
44 Id. § 201, 88 Stat. at 348.
45 Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Sub-
jects of Research, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,196 (Apr. 18, 1979).  According to
the report, “[c]ertain groups, such as racial minorities, the economically disadvantaged, the very
sick, and the institutionalized may continually be sought as research subjects,” and because of
“their dependent status and their frequently compromised capacity for free consent, they should
be protected against the danger of being involved in research solely for administrative conve-
nience, or because they are easy to manipulate as a result of their illness or socioeconomic condi-
tion.” Id. at 23,197.
46 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3) (2011); 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (2011).  The so-called “Com-
mon Rule” mandates that, in evaluating studies “[w]hen some or all of the subjects are likely to
be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence,” an Institutional Review Board must ensure that
“additional safeguards have been included in the study to protect the rights and welfare of these
subjects.” Id. §§ 46.101, 46.111(b); see also Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects
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During the AIDS crisis of the 1980s, however, the pendulum be-
gan to swing in the other direction.  The focus shifted from concerns
regarding the over-enrollment of racial minorities in clinical research
and the inequitable distribution of research risks, to fears regarding
the under-enrollment of minority populations and the resulting ineq-
uitable distribution of research benefits.47  With the cost of health care
increasing rapidly, participation in clinical studies granted not only ac-
cess to basic health care, but also an opportunity to enjoy the advan-
tages of state-of-the-art health technology and treatments, along with
better disease monitoring.48  In addition, studies demonstrated that
participants in clinical trials received better health care and health
outcomes than those who received the same care outside of the re-
search setting.49  Even those individuals who receive placebos in
clinical trials show more improvement than those who receive treat-
ment from a physician outside of a trial.50  Yet, members of minority
populations were less likely to receive these benefits as they were now
severely underrepresented in the overwhelming majority of clinical
studies.51
Another major concern was that virtually no clinical trials fo-
cused on treatments for the diseases and health conditions that dispro-
portionately afflicted minority populations.52  This led to charges that
the failure to include sufficient numbers of racial minorities in clinical
studies prohibited researchers from gleaning important information
regarding disease progression, appropriate treatment, and drug or
therapy responses in minority populations.53  Research data suggested
(‘Common Rule’), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
47 Meltzer & Childress, supra note 38, at 378.
48 Id.; see also Gina Kolata & Kurt Eichenwald, For the Uninsured, Drug Trials Are Health
Care, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1999, at A1 (noting that clinical trials had become a primary source
of medical care for the uninsured); Noah, supra note 12, at 222.
49 Meltzer & Childress, supra note 38, at 378.; see also John D. Lantos, The “Inclusion
Benefit” in Clinical Trials, 134 J. PEDIATRICS 130, 130 (1999).
50 See Lantos, supra note 49 at 130; Shankar Vedantam, Against Depression, a Sugar Pill Is
Hard to Beat, WASH. POST, May 7, 2002, at A1.
51 See Meltzer & Childress, supra note 38, at 379; see also Giselle Corbie-Smith et al.,
Attitudes and Beliefs of African Americans Toward Participation in Medical Research, 14 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 537, 540–42 (1999); Allen L. Gifford et al., Participation in Research and Access
to Experimental Treatments by HIV-Infected Patients, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1373, 1379 (2002);
Talmadge E. King, Jr., Racial Disparities in Clinical Trials, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1400, 1401
(2002); Noah, supra note 12, at 227.
52 See Allen, supra note 40, at 105; Meltzer & Childress, supra note 38, at 379; Syed M.
Mohiuddin & Daniel E. Hilleman, Editorial, Gender and Racial Bias in Clinical Pharmacology
Trials, 27 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 972, 972 (1993); Weijer, supra note 36, at 341–42.
53 Meltzer & Childress, supra note 38, at 379; Ruth Macklin & Gerald Friedland, AIDS
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that racial minority groups responded differently to certain drugs, in-
cluding antihypertensives.54  Other studies appeared to show that
some diseases, particularly certain cancers, progressed differently in
different racial populations.55  As a result, critics argued that scientists
might be jeopardizing the health of excluded or understudied racial
populations by unnecessarily extrapolating research results from
whites to racial minorities, who were then at risk of receiving a mar-
keted drug or therapy that was either ineffective or harmful.56
In response, the NIH issued guidelines in 1990 designed to ensure
the “broadest possible representation of minority groups” in federally
funded medical research.57  These guidelines were strengthened in
1994,58 after Congress enacted the NIH Revitalization Act, which re-
quires researchers who receive federal funds to use race as a variable
in research, particularly as a means of measuring possible variations in
treatment responses among different racial populations.59  In 1998, the
Research: The Ethics of Clinical Trials, 14 LAW, MED., & HEALTH CARE 273, 278–80 (1986); see
also Carol Levine et al., Building a New Consensus: Ethical Principles and Policies for Clinical
Research on HIV/AIDS, 13 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 14 (1991).
54 See, e.g., Craig K. Svensson, Representation of American Blacks in Clinical Trials of New
Drugs, 261 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 263, 263–65 (1989).
55 See, e.g., James J. Dignam et al., Prognosis Among African-American Women and White
Women with Lymph Node Negative Breast Carcinoma, 80 CANCER 80, 88–89 (1997).
56 See Meltzer & Childress, supra note 38, at 380.
57 ADAMHA/NIH Policy Concerning Inclusion of Minorities in Study Populations, 19
NIH GUIDE FOR GRANTS & CONTRACTS 1, 1 (1990) (requiring research grant proposals to “give
appropriate attention to inclusion of minorities in study populations, unless compelling scientific
or other justification for not including minorities is provided”).
58 See NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical
Research, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,508, 14,508 (Mar. 28, 1994) [hereinafter NIH Guidelines] (revising and
superseding guidelines issued in 1990).  The guidelines require the inclusion of racial and ethnic
minorities in all NIH-funded behavioral and biomedical research, unless researchers demon-
strate “a clear and compelling rationale” for their exclusion. Id. at 14,509.
59 See National Institutes of Health (NIH) Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43,
§ 131, 107 Stat. 122, 133 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 289a-2).  The Act mandates the
inclusion of women and minorities as subjects of federally financed clinical research and requires
such researchers to take account of race by: enrolling individuals of diverse racial backgrounds in
clinical trials, identifying research subjects by race and ethnicity, using race as a variable in re-
search, and documenting research results by race. See id.  Researchers conducting Phase III
clinical trials must enroll enough minorities to allow analysis of possible variations in treatment
responses among different groups.  NIH Guidelines, supra note 58, at 14,509; see also U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, POLICY STATEMENT ON INCLUSION OF RACE AND
ETHNICITY IN DHHS DATA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES (Oct. 24, 1997), available at http://
aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/inclusn.htm (acknowledging the “need for an HHS-wide policy on the in-
clusion of data on racial and ethnic groups in HHS data collection and reporting activities”).
Researchers are precluded from circumventing these rules by using cost or geographic location
as a means of excluding racial and ethnic minorities. See Ann A. Hohmann & Delores L. Par-
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FDA passed similar regulations mandating that safety and efficacy
data for drug and biological products be analyzed by racial groups.60
C. Current Understandings of Race in Research
Federal efforts to curb misuses of race in the biomedical research
context have achieved limited success, which can be attributed, in
part, to the fact that these laws and rules were not originally intended
to address race in research.  In fact, the NIH Revitalization Act and
FDA rules were initially conceptualized as means of addressing the
dangers attendant to the gender imbalance in clinical trial research.61
The concern with respect to gender was that the underrepresentation
of women—particularly pregnant women and women of childbearing
age—in clinical research could harm women’s health, both in terms of
their lost opportunity to benefit from participating in trials and the
potential dangers they could suffer by taking marketed drugs and
therapies that had not been tested on women.62  These concerns were
subsequently extended to racial minorities, and lawmakers revised the
law to include these populations.63  Although there are innate biologi-
cal differences between men and women that justify scientific con-
cerns about extrapolating data from male research subjects to women,
current understandings of biology and genetics make clear that race is
a genetically meaningless construct.
ron, How the New NIH Guidelines on Inclusion of Women and Minorities Apply: Efficacy Trials,
Effectiveness Trials, and Validity, 64 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 851, 852 (1996).
60 See Investigational New Drug Applications and New Drug Applications, supra note 5,
at 6,854.  The rule requires that analyses of “effectiveness and safety data for important demo-
graphic subgroups,” including race, be included in new drug applications and that enrollment of
subjects in clinical studies for drug and biological products be documented by demographic sub-
groups in investigational new drug annual reports. Id. at 6,854–55.  Other laws and policies that
require biomedical researchers to catalogue research participants by race include: Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 115, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006) (“The Sec-
retary [of Health and Human Services] shall, in consultation with the Director of the National
Institutes of Health and with representatives of the drug manufacturing industry, review and
develop guidance, as appropriate, on the inclusion of women and minorities in clinical tri-
als . . . .”); FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: POPULATION
PHARMACOKINETICS 1 (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/Spe-
cialTopics/WomensHealthResearch/UCM133184.pdf (advising on the use of population
pharmacokinetics in drug development to evaluate the safety and efficacy of drugs in minority
populations).
61 See Jesse A. Berlin & Susan S. Ellenberg, Commentary, Inclusion of Women in Clinical
Trials, BMC MED. (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/56; Ruth B.
Merkatz & Suzanne White Junod, Historical Background of Changes in FDA Policy on the Study
and Evaluation of Drugs in Women, 69 ACAD. MED. 703, 703–04 (1994).
62 Berlin & Ellenberg, supra note 61.
63 See NIH Revitalization Act § 131, 107 Stat. at 133.
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Scientific understandings of race changed decisively after the
mapping of the human genome revealed that all humans are 99.9%
identical genetically,64 and demonstrated that there is no genetic varia-
tion responsible for the combination of characteristics and features
typically ascribed to race.65  As a result, today, scientists broadly agree
that “[o]ne definite and obvious consequence of the complexity of
human demographic history is that races in any meaningful sense of
the term do not exist in the human species.”66  Indeed, the overwhelm-
ing consensus among geneticists is that “among modern humans,
there’s no such thing as race.”67
Mutable, malleable, and constantly shifting in its social meanings,
race in the United States has historically been defined by skin color,
culture, national origin, language, social or socioeconomic class, or an
amalgamation of all of these traits.68  Race is a social construct, which
means that racial categories, the meaning we attach to these catego-
ries, and the way we determine which individuals will be assigned to
64 See Dutton, supra note 2, at 1.
65 See id.; see also Editorial, Genes, Drugs, and Race, 29 NATURE GENETICS 239, 239
(2001) (“[S]cientists have long been saying that at the genetic level there is more variation be-
tween two individuals in the same population than between populations and that there is no
biological basis for ‘race.’”); Catarina I. Kiefe, Editorial, Race/Ethnicity and Cancer Survival:
The Elusive Target of Biological Differences, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2138, 2138 (2002) ([O]ver
the past several decades, race as a biological construct became largely discredited among scien-
tists . . . .”); Robert S. Schwartz, Racial Profiling in Medical Research, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1392, 1392 (2001) (“Race is a social construct, not a scientific classification.”); Ritchie Witzig,
The Medicalization of Race: Scientific Legitimization of a Flawed Social Construct, 125 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 675, 676 (1996) (“Race is . . . an unscientific social construct . . . .”).
66 David B. Goldstein & Loune`s Chikhi, Human Migrations and Population Structure:
What We Know and Why It Matters, 3 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 129, 137–38
(2002); see also JONATHAN MARKS, HUMAN BIODIVERSITY: GENES, RACE, AND HISTORY 162
(1995); Henry T. Greely, Human Genome Diversity: What about the Other Human Genome Pro-
ject?, 2 NATURE REV. GENETICS 222, 225 (2001); Margaret Lock, Genetic Diversity and the Polit-
ics of Difference, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 83, 87 (1999); Jonathan M. Marks, Scientific and Folk
Ideas About Heredity, in THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES: ETHI-
CAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 53, 61 (Raymond A. Zilinskas & Peter J. Balint eds.,
2001).
67 Dutton, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting Joseph L. Graves, Jr., Dean of University Studies
and Professor of Biological Sciences, North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University);
see also IAN F. HANEY LO´PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE xiii-xiv
(1996); Kiefe, supra note 65, at 2138; Witzig, supra note 65, at 676.
68 Dutton, supra note 2, at 1, 41 (“The idea of race persists in cultures, but it’s not a genetic
definition and it gets confused with cultural relationships.” (quoting Michael Liebman, Execu-
tive Director of the Windber Research Institute)); Laura E. Go´mez, Understanding Law and
Race as Mutually Constitutive: An Invitation to Explore an Emerging Field, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC.
SCI. 487, 490–91 (2010); Jennifer McAndrew, Deep Roots?: New DNA Tests May Reveal Your
Ancestry, but Researchers Urge Caution When Interpreting Results, U. TEX. AUSTIN, http://
www.utexas.edu/features/2007/ancestry/.
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these categories, are all driven by social, cultural, and historical prac-
tices, and are not determined a priori by genetics.69  We assign certain
meanings (e.g., stereotypes and attitudes) to the racial categories we
have constructed, which inform the ways individuals and groups are
perceived.70  Both the categories and the meanings are susceptible to
rapid change.71
II. THE NEW “RACE SCIENTISTS” AND CURRENT MISUSES OF
RACE IN RESEARCH
Despite the fact that current understandings of biology and ge-
netics make clear that race is a genetically meaningless construct, and
that the history of the misuse of race in science illustrates the hazards
of deploying racial categories in biomedical studies, federal laws and
regulations continue to mandate the use of race in government-funded
research.72  Those mandates offer little guidance to researchers on
how and when the use of racial categories is appropriate in light of
new scientific knowledge.73  This has invited widespread abuse of race
in biomedical research.
For example, both the NIH Revitalization Act and the FDA rules
use the racial classifications delineated in the U.S. Office of Manage-
ment and Budget’s (“OMB”) Directive No. 15,74 which was devised to
69 Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback from the Left, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1139,
1144 (2010).  According to Kang: “First, the racial categories change over time and as a function
of politics—just consider how the Census has counted ‘race’ differently over the centuries.  Sec-
ond, the mapping rules are also dynamic—consider how and why, in 1854, the California Su-
preme Court classified the Chinese as racially Indian or Black in order to prevent them from
testifying in court.  Third, consider how the racial meanings associated with a particular category
can rapidly change–e.g., for Asian Americans, debased laborers working on the railroads (mid-
1800s) to yellow peril (1940s) to model minority (late 1960s).” Id. (footnotes omitted).
70 Id. at 1143; see also Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit
Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 465, 468–69 (2010); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1499 (2005).
71 See Kang, supra note 69, at 1144.  Changes to the U.S. Census over the years illustrate
the malleability of racial categories, as in 1997 the federal government increased the number of
recognized racial categories from four (American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific
Islander, Black, and White) to five (American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, Black or Afri-
can American, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and White).  U.S. Census Bureau,
Racial and Ethnic Classifications Used in Census 2000 and Beyond, http://www.pacificweb.org/
DOCS/PopRaceAncestry/Race/Racial%20and%20Ethnic%20Classifications%202000.pdf.
72 See NIH Guidelines, supra note 58, at 14,508–10.
73 See id.
74 See generally Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race
and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782 (Oct. 30, 1997).  Directive No. 15 data is also used for tracking
many important civil rights efforts in the areas of school desegregation, electoral districting, and
the provision of goods and services to those who belong to particular racial groups. See MELISSA
NOBLES, SHADES OF CITIZENSHIP: RACE AND THE CENSUS IN MODERN POLITICS 79–84 (2000);
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provide a uniform standard for maintaining, collecting, and presenting
data on race and ethnicity for the U.S. Census and all other federal
reporting purposes.75  These racial categories are: American Indian or
Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Hispanic or La-
tino, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and White.76  Where
some biomedical researchers get into trouble is that they assume that
these racial categories can provide a scientifically useful means of cap-
turing geographic ancestry to estimate genetic profiles.77  Thus, re-
searchers who wish to conduct studies or test drugs on a genetically
similar group of people might use race as a rough approximation of
geographic ancestry.78  This is so despite the fact that race is an imper-
fect proxy for geographic origin.
The mandate to use racial categories in biomedical studies allows
researchers to work from the assumption that people of the same race
are likely to have ancestors who originated in the same geographic
locale and thus have a similar genetic constitution.  This assumption is
being used in the estimation of genetic profiles.79  This Part maps how
this crude estimate is increasingly being employed in the formulation
of race-specific drugs and therapeutics by examining the FDA’s ap-
proval of the drug BiDil, which was developed to treat heart disease in
black people.80
Kenneth E. Payson, Check One Box: Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the Classification of
Mixed-Race People, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1233, 1234, 1256 (1996) (noting that the racial classifica-
tions the Directive identifies are socially created, not “scientific or anthropological”).
75 See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: COLLECTION OF RACE
AND ETHNICITY DATA IN CLINICAL TRIALS 2–3 (2005),  http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regula-
toryInformation/Guidances/ucm126396.pdf.
76 Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity,
62 Fed. Reg. at 58,782; see also Alice Robbin, Classifying Racial and Ethnic Group Data in the
United States: The Politics of Negotiation and Accommodation, 27 J. GOV’T INFO. 129, 131–32
(2000).
77 See, e.g., Pilar Ossorio & Troy Duster, Race and Genetics: Controversies in Biomedical,
Behavioral, and Forensic Sciences, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 115, 115 (2005).
78 Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 425–26.
79 See generally Race, Ethnicity, and Genetics Working Grp., The Use of Racial, Ethnic,
and Ancestral Categories in Human Genetics Research, 77 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 519 (2005).
Generally, humans as a species do not randomly mate with one another, but rather have histori-
cally tended to mate with those who live in close geographic proximity to them.  This has given
rise to various subpopulations among humans that express different variations in allelic frequen-
cies.  This can be attributed to either the effects of natural selection or genetic drift, which is the
propensity of groups that do not randomly mate with other groups to develop distinct allelic
frequencies. See id. at 519-32.
80 See generally Kahn, supra note 8 (discussing the development of BiDil).
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A. Pharmaceutical Drug Development
Deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) is a molecule that encodes the
genetic information or hereditary material in humans and almost all
other organisms.81  The DNA molecule is made up of a string of chem-
icals called nucleotides that consist of sugar, phosphate, and a base.82
The bases are critically important, because their order or sequence in
the DNA molecule forms the genetic code of the organism.83  Some
DNA sequences act as a sort of “genetic fingerprint,” because two
unrelated individuals are unlikely to have the same DNA sequence at
the same location on the same chromosome.84  This variation in gene
sequence that differs from person to person is called an allele.85  Al-
though all humans are 99.9% identical genetically and hence most
gene sequences are the same from person to person, the remaining
0.1% difference is represented in these alleles, which are responsible
for producing genetic diseases and for creating the variations among
individuals that allow them to be identified by samples of their
DNA.86
During the late 1990s, pharmaceutical companies began focusing
their energy on the 0.1% difference among humans identified by the
Human Genome Project in an attempt to develop drugs for, and to
81 LORI B. ANDREWS ET AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW, AND POLICY 17 (3d ed. 2010).
82 Id.  There are four bases—adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine—which are identi-
fied by their initials: A, G, C, and T.  These bases bond to each other according to strict rules: A
and T only bond to each other, and G and C only bond to each other. Id.  According to Lori
Andrews: “In humans and other higher organisms, the DNA molecule actually is two strands of
DNA, as if you reunited the two halves of [a] ladder.  Each of the sides of the ladder is a strip of
sugars and phosphates.  The rungs are the bases that stick out and that are connected together in
pairs according to the bonding rules: A with T, G with C.  This double-stranded DNA molecule
is twisted around the mid-point of the rungs to give it its famous ‘double-helix’ appearance.” Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 22–23, 682–83.  Genetic identification relies on short, repeated sequences of
DNA, known as tandem repeats, which consist of one half of the bonded base pairs of DNA
arranged one behind the other throughout a chromosome. See id. at 679–83.  Thus, a tandem
repeat is akin to a “stutter in the genome, e.g., ACCGACCGACCG.” Id. at 682.  A tandem
repeat acts as a sort of genetic “fingerprint” because two unrelated individuals are unlikely to
have the same number of tandem repeats at the same location on the same chromosome. See id.
at 679–83.
85 Id. at 23.
86 Id.  For example, most people have 26 or fewer CAG repeats in a gene that codes for
production of the protein huntingtin, but people with many more repeats on this gene will de-
velop Huntington’s disease.  People without the CTT sequence at position 508 of the CFTR gene
will develop cystic fibrosis.  These are examples of different alleles of the same gene. Id. at
22–23.
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market them to, specific groups.87  The drugs they were formulating
are known as pharmacogenomic drugs, which are medications that are
devised specifically to target particular genetic variations.88  These
drugs allow physicians to select the correct drug and dose for each
patient, thereby increasing drug efficacy while preventing adverse re-
actions.89  Thus, pharmacogenomic drugs are seen as the first step to-
wards “personalized medicine,” according to which drugs and other
therapies are chosen specifically for each patient’s individual
genotype.90
In March of 2001, the FDA approved biotech company Ni-
troMed’s proposal to conduct the first clinical trials specifically de-
signed to study the efficacy of a pharmaceutical drug for the treatment
of heart failure in one particular racial group: African Americans.91
The  African American Heart Failure Trial enrolled exclusively men
and women who “self-identified” as black, which was defined as being
of African American descent.92  The trial appeared to demonstrate a
notable health improvement in trial subjects when the drug, BiDil,
was taken along with other medications.93  NitroMed also conducted a
racial subgroup analysis of African Americans who had participated in
an earlier study.94
During the FDA hearings that followed the clinical trial, repre-
sentatives from many diverse organizations and institutions pushed
for the approval of BiDil as a means of addressing a life-threatening
health condition in a group historically marginalized by the health
care and medical research communities.95  The Association of Black
87 See Guillaume Sillon et al., An Ethical and Legal Overview of Pharmacogenomics: Per-
spectives and Issues, 27 MED. & L. 843, 844–45 (2008).
88 Id. at 844–47.  A mix of pharmacology and genomics, pharmacogenomics examines the
influence of genetic variation on drug responses in patients to predict patterns of reactions to
drugs and facilitate research and development of new, targeted therapies. See id.  The promise
of pharmacogenomic drugs is that they may increase the effectiveness of medications and better
predict and thus prevent the adverse effects of medications and therapies. See id.
89 Id.
90 Michelle Meadows, Genomics and Personalized Medicine, FDA CONSUMER, Nov.-Dec.
2005, at 12, 13; see also Francis S. Collins et al., Implications of the Genome Project for Medical
Science, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RESEARCH INST., http://www.genome.gov/25019925 (last updated
Feb. 24, 2011).
91 Gregory Michael Dorr & David S. Jones, Facts and Fictions: BiDil and the Resurgence




95 See Susan M. Reverby, “Special Treatment”: BiDil, Tuskeegee, and the Logic of Race, 36
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 478, 478–79 (2008).
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Cardiologists, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, and the National Minority Health Month Founda-
tion, for example, supported FDA approval of the drug.96  Further, the
Congressional Black Caucus gave BiDil its “clear and unequivocal”
endorsement, and Delegate Donna Christian-Christensen of the U.S.
Virgin Islands opined: “Would you deny a life now to us rather than
do what the evidence shows can and should be done?”97
When the FDA approved BiDil in June of 2005, the agency had
never before sanctioned the release of a drug with a race-specific indi-
cation.98  Upon entering the market, BiDil was celebrated as the first
“ethnic drug” and hailed as a revolutionary pharmaceutical that would
treat a deadly health condition that had plagued African Americans, a
group long and woefully underserved by the health care system.99  Ni-
troMed’s Chief Executive Officer declared: “There is absolutely no
question of the value of BiDil in the treatment of congestive heart
failure in African Americans.”100  BiDil did prove quite effective in
the treatment of heart failure among African Americans.101  The only
problem was that it was equally effective at reducing heart failure in
people of other races.102  As it turned out, the drug did not work bet-
ter or differently in African Americans than in people of other racial
groups.103
The BiDil case is illustrative of how race is increasingly being em-
ployed in biomedical research and also demonstrates the problems
that stem from the current use of race in research.  This Article now
addresses each of these problems and concerns in turn.
B. Approximating Geographic Ancestry
When clinicians seek to conduct studies or test drugs on a group
of people who are alike genetically, they may use race to estimate
96 DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS
RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 181 (2011).
97 Reverby, supra note 95, at 479.
98 See id. at 478.
99 See Jonathan Kahn, “Ethnic” Drugs, 35 HASTINGS CENTER REP. inside back cover
(2005); Kahn, supra note 9, at 379.
100 Reverby, supra note 95, at 484 n.38; see also Ron Winslow, FDA Is Prepared to Approve
Heart Drug Intended for Treating African-Americans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2001, at B6.
101 Kahn, supra note 99.
102 Id.
103 See id.; Pamela Sankar & Jonathan Kahn, Bidil: Race Medicine or Race Marketing?,
HEALTH AFFAIRS W5-460-61 (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/con-
tent/full/hlthaff.w5.455/dc1.
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geographic ancestry.104  In other words, clinicians use race as a means
of determining where on the planet a particular research subject’s an-
cestors could have come from.  The assumption is that people whose
ancestors originated in the same geographic locale will have similar
allele frequencies due to the tendency of individuals to mate with
those who live in close geographic proximity to them.105  Black re-
search participants are presumed to have a preponderance of African
ancestry, while white subjects are assumed to have primarily Euro-
pean ancestors.106  This common practice of using the five racial
groups identified by Directive No. 15 as a convenient means of repre-
senting common ancestry to predict the presence of certain allele fre-
quencies is problematic for a number of reasons.
First, racial information for clinical trials often is produced
through self-identification by research participants.107  Studies have
shown that individuals are typically unable to identify their complete
geographic or ethnic ancestry,108 and a person whose skin color is per-
ceived as white can have eighty percent recent West African ancestry,
while a person whose skin color is perceived as black can have a pre-
dominance of alleles that indicate European ancestry.109  In addition,
understandings of racial identity differ both within the United States
and all over the world.110  Plus, many people do not identify them-
selves as belonging to any one particular racial group.111  Thus, the
104 See Ossorio & Duster, supra note 77, at 116; Anne L. Taylor & Jackson T. Wright,
Should Ethnicity Serve as a Basis for Clinical Trial Design?, 112 CIRCULATION 3654, 3658 (2005).
105 See generally Race, Ethnicity and Genetics Working Grp., supra note 79.
106 See Mark D. Shriver et al., Skin Pigmentation, Biogeographical Ancestry and Admixture
Mapping, 112 HUM. GENETICS 387, 387 (2003).
107 See Jonathan Kahn, Genes, Race, and Population: Avoiding a Collision of Categories, 96
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1965, 1965 (2006).
108 See Celeste Condit et. al., Attitudinal Barriers to Delivery of Race-Targeted Pharmacoge-
nomics Among Informed Lay Persons, 5 GENETICS IN MED. 385, 388 (2003).
109 Ossorio & Duster, supra note 77, at 118; see also Flavia C. Parra et al., Color and Geno-
mic Ancestry in Brazilians, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 177, 177 (2003); Shriver, supra note 106,
at 387–99.
110 Sundquist, supra note 21, at 263.  Globally, the concept of race is very fluid because
ideas regarding racial identification differ sharply among various countries. Id.  For example, an
aboriginal Australian might be considered black (typically understood as Sub-Saharan African
ancestry) in the United States. See Race, Ethnicity and Genetics Working Grp., supra note 79, at
522.  Similarly, an individual who might be considered Hispanic or Chicano in some parts of the
United States would be considered white in others. See Ossorio & Duster, supra note 77, at 119.
111 See Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1392 (“Following the decision by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget to allow multiple responses to a question on racial identification in the 2000
Census, almost 7 million people identified themselves as members of more than one race; about
800,000 respondents said they were both white and black.”); see also Eric Schmitt, For 7 Million
People in Census, One Race Category Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at A1.
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clinicians who rely upon these varying notions of race are accepting
others’ potentially dissonant decisions about race, and, in so doing,
these clinicians produce data that lacks meaningful uniformity.  When
clinicians impute these sampling biases and discordant understandings
of race into their studies, they not only forsake their own professional
training, but they generate flawed results.
Second, the notion that the millions of people within each of the
Directive No. 15 categories share a common geographic heritage, and
are therefore likely to be more “related” genetically in some apprecia-
ble way, is scientifically unfounded.112  This notion has long been re-
futed, as genetic variations based upon ancestral geographic origins do
not map seamlessly onto racial categories.113  This is because any two
unrelated individuals selected randomly from anywhere on the planet
will be 99.9% the same genetically.114  The overwhelming majority of
human genetic variation—roughly 85% of the 0.1% difference—can
be found between any two individuals from within the same racial or
ethnic group.115  Indeed, there is more variation between two individu-
112 See Ossorio & Duster, supra note 77, at 116–17.  Scientists have long known that human
skin color and physical traits tend to be similar among groups that are geographically close and
then vary gradually as groups become more distant geographically.  This phenomenon, known as
clinical variation, also occurs with alleles that differ among human groups.  In addition, these
varying traits and alleles tend to vary at differing rates.  This phenomenon, known as “noncon-
cordant variation,” is the reason why anthropologists of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, who attempted to classify human races based on observable physical traits, identified over
fifty “races” and finally concluded that there are no discrete, nonoverlapping races.  The same
has been true of modern scientists studying differences among humans based on allele frequen-
cies. See id.
113 See Dutton, supra note 2, at 43; Sundquist, supra note 21, at 261–63.  As explained by
Dr. Ritchie Witzig:
[H]uman complexions do not fit a primary color scheme.  No person is absolutely
white or black or any other color . . . .  Rather, complexion hues can be character-
ized as ranging from very light to very dark, and complexions vary widely within
each racial group.  For these reasons, grouping by skin color has no scientific mean-
ing when the result of the grouping is construed as either a race or ethnicity.
Witzig, supra note 65, at 676; see also Goldstein & Chikhi, supra note 66, at 137–38 (“One defi-
nite and obvious consequence of the complexity of human demographic history is that races in
any meaningful sense of the term do not exist in the human species.”).
114 See Ossorio & Duster, supra note 77, at 117 (explaining that humans demonstrate strik-
ingly little genetic variation when compared to other species).  Indeed, chimpanzees, which are
primates that are closely related to humans, have roughly four times as much within-species
genetic variation as humans. See id.  The homogeneity among humans is due to the fact that
humans are a relatively young species in evolutionary terms. See id.
115 See id.  For example, when a group of white people from Italy is compared with a group
of white people from Norway, about 10% of the time a researcher will find a genetic variant that
is relatively frequent in one group and infrequent in the other.  The maximum genetic variation
between any two groups (ethnic, racial, or religious) is 15% of the 0.1% difference.  Of this 15%,
the maximum observed genetic variation among different groups from the same continent (e.g.,
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als within a racial group than there is between racial groups,116 and
black people the world over exhibit more internal genetic diversity
than any other racialized group, despite the fact that they are often
understood and treated as though they are alike genetically.117  Thus,
unrelated people in the same racial population do not necessarily have
much shared or common ancestry and cannot be understood to be
genetically similar in ways that make a difference for between-group
comparisons.118
It is important to note that there are a small number of genetic
variants that can affect predispositions to illness, longevity, and other
aspects of health status, which manifest among people who share the
same ancestral geographic origin.  For instance, cystic fibrosis is signif-
icantly more likely to afflict individuals of European descent than
those of Asian ancestry.119  These gene mutations typically developed
in response to particular environmental conditions, and often provide
certain advantages.  Thus, the so-called “Black Death” gene mutation,
which originated in Europe during the fourteenth century during the
Black Plague, allowed those with this allele variation to survive the
plague and remains an identifiable genetic variation.120  Similarly, in-
dependent mutations in the β-globin gene, which originated in central
and western Africa, cause the sickle cell trait and protect against ma-
laria.121  While both of these variant genes may indicate geographic
ancestry, they do not adhere to a distinct phenotype or express race in
a biologically legitimate way.122  The most common of these allele fre-
white Swedes and white Croatians) is 10%.  And among different groups from different conti-
nents (e.g., white Swedes and black Kenyans), there is a mere 5% observed difference.  There-
fore, because the majority of genetic difference is found within any group, people of the same
race are not genetically similar in ways that make a difference for between-group comparisons.
See id.
116 See Editorial, Genes, Drugs and Race, supra note 65, at 239; R.C. Lewontin, The Appor-
tionment of Human Diversity, in 6 EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 381, 397 (Theodosius Dobzhansky
et al. eds., 1972); R.C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typ-
ing, 254 SCIENCE 1745, 1747 (1991).
117 See Ossorio & Duster, supra note 77, at 118.
118 See id. at 117.
119 Horacio Cardoso et al., A Low Prevalence of Cystic Fibrosis in Uruguayans of Mainly
European Descent, 3 GENETICS & MOLECULAR RES. 258, 259 (2004).
120 See S.R. Duncan et al., Reappraisal of the Historical Selective Pressures for the CCR5-
A¨32 Mutation, 42 J. MED. GENETICS 205 (2005).
121 See LUIGI LUCA CAVALLI-SFORZA, GENES, PEOPLES, AND LANGUAGES 48 (Mark Seiel-
stad trans., 2000); see also Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1393.
122 Tay-Sachs disease, which is found primarily among Ashkenazi Jews, is another gene
mutation that can be linked to a very small population that practices endogamy and who may
have derived from a particular geographic region. See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 425;
Nicholas Wade, Diseases Common in Ashkenazim May Be Random, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at
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quencies can be found anywhere in the world; thus, having the genetic
variant will not necessarily correspond to one’s geographic origin, skin
color, or “race.”123  Indeed, for decades, physicians believed that sickle
cell disease was exclusively African,124 but it can also be found in
other areas where malaria is endemic, such as Greece, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, and Iran.125  Notably, although sickle cell is commonly associ-
ated with black people, the highest incidence of the gene mutation—a
rate double that for African Americans—can be found in a population
in Greece.126  Meanwhile, Kenyans have a low frequency of sickle cell
due to the fact that they live at altitudes where the threat of malaria is
significantly reduced.127
Thus, while one’s allele frequency can tell us something about
where some of one’s ancestors came from, or something about one’s
predisposition to certain health conditions, it will not necessarily cor-
respond to a particular racial categorization.  Nor does perceived race
or an individual’s racial self-identification reliably indicate anything
meaningful about her or his genes.128
C. Commercial Incentives
Today, there are powerful economic and regulatory incentives
that encourage researchers to use racial data as the basis for develop-
F2.  Like the other variant genes, it does not indicate skin color. See Schwartz, supra note 65, at
1393.
123 See Ossorio & Duster, supra note 77, at 116.  Ossorio and Duster explain that defini-
tions of race as based in geographic ancestry
imply a simplistic model of human migration and expansion throughout the world,
a model in which small groups of humans traveled to each continent at about the
same time, became reproductively isolated and then expanded rapidly to fill the
continent in the absence of subsequent events that would create significant within-
race patterns of human genetic variation—a nice ‘just so story’ that is largely con-
sistent with folk beliefs about race, but a story that is contradicted by data from
anthropology and human genetics[.]
Id.
124 Elizabeth Landau, How Medicine Is Advancing Beyond Race, CNN.COM (July 8, 2011,
7:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/07/08/race.personalized.medicine/index.html?
hpt=hp_bn6.
125 See Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1393; see also CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 121, at 48.
126 JAMIE D. BROOKS & MEREDITH L. KING, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GENETICIZING DIS-
EASE: IMPLICATIONS FOR RACIAL HEALTH DISPARITIES 11 (2008).
127 Id.
128 See Dutton, supra note 2, at 41 (“The correlation between ancestral origins and self-
identified race and ethnicity is often imprecise . . . ‘because of other non-genetic connotations of
race, the lack of defined boundaries between populations, and the fact that many people have
ancestors from multiple regions of the world.’”  (quoting Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the
National Human Genome Research Institute)).
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ing new drugs and therapeutics.  Federal patent laws, for example, of-
fer lucrative economic incentives to biotech and pharmaceutical
companies that devise drugs for particular groups.129  These companies
are constantly competing to develop patentable drugs and technolo-
gies.  If they formulate a new drug or discover a new indication for an
existing drug, they could possibly obtain or extend a patent on that
drug to enjoy market exclusivity.130  Thus, these companies have been
scouring the 0.1% difference in the human genome to find allele fre-
quencies that might be responsible for certain conditions or diseases,
notwithstanding that this tiny percentage of the genome includes eve-
rything from genetic illnesses to blood type.131
BiDil was a combination of two generic drugs with expiring pat-
ents.132  If BiDil had been approved for the general population, then
NitroMed’s patent protection for the drug would have expired in
2007.133  However, by using race as a proxy for geographic ancestry,
retrospectively examining race-coded data from old studies, and re-
stricting subsequent clinical trials to only black participants, the com-
pany was able to find a race-based difference in drug response.134  In
so doing, the company persuaded the FDA to approve BiDil’s race-
specific indication, thereby giving NitroMed an additional thirteen
years to sell the drug without competition.135  Once on the market,
BiDil cost four to seven times more than the equivalent generic
drugs.136
Not surprisingly, in recent years, many more biotech and pharma-
ceutical companies have attempted to develop race-specific drugs in
an effort to exploit this potential gold mine.  The biopharmaceutical
company VaxGen, for example, in 2003 conducted a retrospective
analysis of racial subpopulations to obtain approval for its proposed
AIDS vaccine, AIDSVAX.137  In its clinical trials, AIDSVAX did not
reduce infection rates in the study population as a whole; neverthe-
129 See Kahn, supra note 8, at 31–33.
130 See id. at 32.
131 See generally Kahn, supra note 107; Schwartz, supra note 65.  Examples of allelic varia-
tions include hemoglobin susceptibility to breast cancer and blood type. Id.
132 Kahn, supra note 8, at 30.
133 Id. at 32.
134 Dorr & Jones, supra note 91, at 445.
135 See U.S. Patent No. 6,465,463 (filed Sept. 8, 2000) (issued Oct. 15, 2002).
136 See ROBERTS, supra note 96, at 185; BROOKS & KING, supra note 126, at 10.  BiDil costs
insurers approximately $1,400 to $2,800 per year per patient; neither Medicaid nor Medicare will
cover the cost of the drug because they cover the two less expensive generic drugs that BiDil
combines. Id.
137 Jonathan Kahn, Race in a Bottle, SCI. AM., Aug. 2007, at 40, 45.
1142 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1115
less, VaxGen maintained that the black and Asian study participants
experienced a significant reduction in infections.138  Yet, as Professor
Jonathan Kahn has noted, because only a few hundred blacks and
Asians participated in the trial, a small number of infections easily
could have distorted the results.139  In the end, VaxGen’s assertion that
its drug performed better in particular racial populations was under-
mined by another clinical trial in Thailand that showed AIDSVAX
was ineffective.140
Similarly, the British pharmaceutical giant, AstraZeneca, claimed
that its lung cancer drug, Iressa, performed better in the Asian sub-
jects enrolled in a 2004 clinical trial, even though survival rates did not
improve overall for participants in the trial.141  The FDA, unswayed by
the company’s claims, ultimately prohibited use of the drug by new
patients.142  Undeterred by the FDA’s actions with respect to Iressa,
AstraZeneca has more recently conducted trials of its blockbuster
cholesterol-reducing drug, Crestor, in African Americans, South
Asians, and Hispanics.143  The patent for the drug, which has earned
the company billions of dollars, is set to expire in 2016.144  Regardless
of whether AstraZeneca succeeds with a race-based indication for
Crestor, there are likely many more race-specific drugs in the
pipeline.145
III. RACE-BASED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND
CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS
Federal laws and regulations that mandate the grouping of indi-
viduals into racial categories in government-funded research, yet pro-
vide no meaningful guidance, oversight, or effective curbs for
inappropriate uses, not only lead to bad science but also harm minor-







144 See Ben Hirschler, AstraZeneca Back in Court to Defend Crestor Patent, REUTERS (Oct.
5, 2011, 8:49 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/astrazeneca-crestor-idUSL5E7L5
1DQ20111005.  “Consumer groups have claimed that Crestor is less safe than other cholesterol-
lowering drugs, but AstraZeneca says the race-specific studies demonstrate the safety and effi-
cacy of the medicine.” See Kahn, supra note 137, at 45.
145 See generally Sarah K. Tate & David B. Goldstein, Will Tomorrow’s Medicines Work for
Everyone?, 36 NATURE GENETICS SUPPLEMENT S34, S36 tbl.1 (2004).  At least 29 drugs in devel-
opment are claimed to be more effective in certain racial groups than others. Id. at S34.
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ries should never be used as variables in biomedical research, while
others contend that the mandate to include racial categories in gov-
ernment-funded studies violates the equal protection doctrine.146  This
Article argues, by contrast, that although there are many important
reasons for the state to continue requiring the use of race as a variable
in biomedical research, in doing so, the government must proceed
with care to avoid enabling the abuses of race that are now rampant in
this context.
Determining how to accomplish this goal raises an obvious ques-
tion: What are the appropriate boundaries for the use of race by the
government in this context?  The demands of science and law inform
this question, and this Article addresses the latter with an eye toward
developing a workable model for regulating race in biomedical re-
search, which is advanced in Part IV.  The question of how the state
may regulate uses of race in research has been debated by scholars
from a variety of perspectives.  On the one hand, health law scholars
who have engaged this question have done so too narrowly, while on
the other hand, constitutional law and race scholars have done so too
broadly.  Health law scholars’ focus on the doctrinal contours of equal
protection jurisprudence (e.g., strict scrutiny, racial classifications,
compelling interests, etc.) constrains their ability to fully appreciate
the aspect of the Court’s jurisprudence that tolerates some degree of
race consciousness without imposing strict scrutiny.  Constitutional
law and race scholars’ argument that the Court’s race jurisprudence is
predominantly characterized by a norm of colorblindness sweeps too
broadly as a comprehensive understanding of that jurisprudence.  Al-
though they are correct to recognize that the norm of colorblindness
seriously constrains state uses of race, there still are instances in this
same body of cases where government invocations of race that reflect
its social significance are acceptable.
This Part culls from the Court’s race cases across a number of
legal regimes a discrete set of principles that reveal the extent to
which courts have allowed state actors to engage in race-conscious
decisionmaking.  This Article terms this strain of reasoning “racial
pragmatism.”  This Part demonstrates how the adoption of racial prag-
matist reasoning in the biomedical research context can not only im-
prove the way race is deployed in research, but also increase the
likelihood of achieving racial justice in and through biomedical re-
search.  Indeed, a reading of the Court’s equal protection jurispru-
146 See infra Part III.A.
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dence as embracing a form of racial pragmatism has important
implications for the use of race in government-sponsored scientific re-
search as well as public health policy.
This Part begins by examining the ongoing debate among legal
scholars on the appropriate uses of race in biomedical research and
the extent to which equal protection strict scrutiny analysis can inform
regulatory decisionmaking.  This Part then moves beyond strict scru-
tiny analysis by examining the racial pragmatist perspective.  To reveal
the analytical nuances of racial pragmatism, this Part maps the Su-
preme Court’s turn toward colorblindness in its antidiscrimination ju-
risprudence and demonstrates how, notwithstanding its seeming
allegiance to colorblindness, the Court also engages in racial pragma-
tist reasoning when examining the use of racial categories by state ac-
tors.  In so doing, the Court allows race-conscious decisionmaking by
government under certain circumstances.
This Part concludes by textually examining the Court’s equal pro-
tection caselaw, across contexts and legal regimes, to identify the fac-
tors that appear to determine whether a particular state invocation of
race will be examined under a racial pragmatist perspective and be
deemed constitutionally unproblematic, or will be considered a consti-
tutionally suspect “racial classification” that triggers equal protection
strict scrutiny analysis and requires the state to offer a compelling in-
terest.  In so doing, this Part focuses on the Court’s education, voting
rights, and criminal suspect identification jurisprudence.
A. Debating the Regulation of Race in Biomedical Research
Over the past few years, legal scholars have debated and dis-
cussed the ways in which the law may regulate the use of race in the
biomedical sciences, and most scholars have drawn upon strict scru-
tiny analysis under the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.147  Ap-
plication of equal protection doctrine148 involves two analytically
distinct steps: the reviewing court must first determine whether the
government’s action implicates a constitutionally suspect classification
(e.g., race or gender), and then it must apply the appropriate level of
147 See Kahn, supra note 107, at 1967; Kahn, supra note 8, at 44; Lillquist & Sullivan, supra
note 7, at 461–65; Obasogie, supra note 9, at 496; Roberts, supra note 9, at 529–30.
148 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws”).  The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that
all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).  The Supreme Court has held that this Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee applies to the federal government as an aspect of Fifth Amendment due process.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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judicial scrutiny.149  If the government’s action involves a racial classi-
fication, the court will apply strict scrutiny, the highest level of judicial
review.  Under strict scrutiny, the government must prove that its ac-
tion or law serves a compelling governmental interest and is essential
to achieving that interest (i.e., the least restrictive means of realizing
that interest).150
1. Race Through the Lens of Strict Scrutiny
Many legal scholars apply equal protection strict scrutiny analysis
in the biomedical research context to evaluate the laws and regula-
tions that mandate the introduction of racial categories into biomedi-
cal research.151  Some of these scholars focus on the vulnerability of
these laws and policies to heightened constitutional scrutiny.  They ar-
gue that the NIH Revitalization Act “clearly involves a racial classifi-
cation” that would trigger strict scrutiny review, while the FDA rules
allow the agency to “knowingly fund[ ] discriminatory trials” and
therefore require the agency to demonstrate that its actions are nar-
rowly tailored.152  These legal commentators propose prohibiting
“both government authorization of race-based clinical trials and gov-
ernment funding of studies in which race is the variable of interest,
149 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 216 (1995) (quoting McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1964)).  Although the Equal Protection Clause originated from
a concern about race-based discrimination, the court has interpreted the clause to apply to such
classifications as gender, alienage, and illegitimacy, as well as to government actions that burden
a “fundamental interest,” including voting and access to courts. See Pers. Admin’r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (gender); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973) (alien-
age); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (illegitimacy); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561
(1964) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (access to courts).
150 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235.  Depending on the type of classification or whether a funda-
mental right is involved, the court will apply one of three levels of equal protection scrutiny,
listed here in descending order of stringency: Racial classifications receive strict scrutiny, gender
classifications receive intermediate scrutiny, and all other classifications, including those that
implicate age, socioeconomic status, disability, or sexual orientation, receive rational basis re-
view. See id. (applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273 (applying
intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (applying rational ba-
sis review).
151 See, e.g., Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 464; Roberts, supra note 9, at 532.
152 Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 463–65.  According to Lillquist and Sullivan:
To the extent that racial qualifications are revealed in HHS grant applications, the
federal government would be knowingly funding discriminatory trials.  To the ex-
tent that the FDA is approving [new drug applications] using race as a qualification,
the agency is legalizing the use of drugs that would otherwise be illegal in order to
authorize discrimination.  This would seem to constitute a racial classification that
could be justified only by the agency in question demonstrating a compelling inter-
est for the discrimination and that the restriction was narrowly tailored.
Id. at 463; see also Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 14, at 540.
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except when a compelling interest can be identified . . . and research-
ers can show why they need to use race instead of using genetic
markers.”153
Other scholars employ strict scrutiny analysis as a normative
framework through which to evaluate laws that regulate the use of
race in research.154  Professor Dorothy Roberts, for example, proposes
using race as a sociopolitical category in biomedical research rather
than a genetic category, and grounds her important and innovative
“social justice” framework in equal protection strict scrutiny analysis
because, according to Roberts:
[T]he strict scrutiny test asks the same fundamental question
as a social justice approach: when does attention to race le-
gitimately further the state’s interest in racial equality?
While racial categories may further compelling interests in
improving health care and promoting racial equality, are
they “benign” and narrowly tailored to further these inter-
ests, or are they insufficiently tied to these aims?155
2. Beyond Strict Scrutiny
Scholars who rely upon strict scrutiny analysis are constrained by
the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence because the
Court’s acceptance of colorblindness as the primary animating princi-
ple in the doctrine has, in many ways, rendered application of strict
scrutiny “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”156  Once courts apply strict
scrutiny, the law or government action almost inevitably fails.  As a
result, examining the regulation of race in biomedical research by ap-
plying equal protection strict scrutiny analysis is likely to constitute an
exercise in futility.
Even scholars who employ strict scrutiny analysis as a normative
lens through which to determine appropriate and inappropriate uses
of race in biomedical research will find their theories difficult to put
into practice, as the identification of a state interest that courts will
153 Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 14 at 547–48.
154 Kahn, supra note 107, at 1967 (suggesting that the government require a “tight fit” when
researchers attempt to conflate the social categories of race and ethnicity with genetic categories
of populations in biomedical and clinical research); Kahn, supra note 8, at 44 (arguing that the
FDA should reject an application to use race as a biological or genetic category unless the appli-
cant can satisfy the equal protection strict scrutiny test); Obasogie, supra note 9, at 496 (propos-
ing adopting equal protection strict scrutiny analysis as a “regulatory guidepost” for devising an
oversight mechanism to govern the development of race-specific drugs).
155 Roberts, supra note 9, at 532.
156 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980).
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find sufficiently “compelling” and “narrowly tailored” to survive strict
scrutiny presents a formidable challenge.  Hence, legal scholars who
seek to preserve the use of race as a variable in biomedical research
will likely find reliance upon strict scrutiny analysis to be an insuffi-
cient effort.
If, however, we allow ourselves to look beneath strict scrutiny
analysis to the normative objectives and concerns that motivate it, we
will see that, although the Court’s race jurisprudence is heavily influ-
enced by a colorblind norm, it is neither as coherent nor unyielding as
its recent antidiscrimination caselaw suggests.157  The Court has, in
fact, at times permitted certain invocations of race by government ac-
tors.  The Court has held that such race-conscious decisionmaking is
not only presumptively acceptable but normatively desirable and, as
such, does not constitute a “racial classification” deserving of strict
scrutiny.158  This line of reasoning by the Court is “racial pragmatism.”
Racial pragmatism represents a strain of judicial reasoning, oper-
ating within the existing colorblind analytical paradigm, that allows
for real-world understandings of race.  Although racial pragmatism
does not mitigate the way colorblindness hinders efforts to remedy
past and ongoing race discrimination, jurists’ reliance upon racial
pragmatist reasoning does demonstrate that even those jurists who
generally embrace a colorblindness norm have on occasion been un-
easy about the implications of taking colorblindness to its logical con-
clusion.159  As a result, some jurists and a minority of Justices whose
ordinary orientation is towards colorblindness have at times distanced
themselves from it as a normative and practical matter, favoring in-
stead a more pragmatic understanding of the salience of race.160
The following Sections posit that the principles and themes that
undergird racial pragmatist reasoning can provide useful guidelines
for thinking about race generally and for conceptualizing appropriate
uses of race in science.  Indeed, this Part demonstrates that although
racial pragmatist reasoning can be problematically applied, the rea-
soning itself represents a useful approach to considering appropriate
regulation in this context.  Therefore, because I share the social justice
aspirations of Professor Roberts and others with respect to the regula-
tion of race in research, the following Sections demonstrate how these
157 See infra Part III.B.
158 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
159 See id.
160 See infra Part III.C.
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aspirations can be achieved without automatically defaulting to the
increasingly circumscribed equal protection strict scrutiny analysis.
B. Colorblind Norms and Limits in Equal Protection
Since the 1960s, culminating in the 2008 presidential campaign
and the historic election of the nation’s first African American presi-
dent, commentators, jurists, and academics have increasingly debated,
embraced, and bemoaned what is popularly known as “colorblind-
ness.”  As an ideology, discursive practice, and the Supreme Court’s
primary analytical approach to antidiscrimination caselaw, colorblind-
ness stands for the proposition that state actions that invoke racial
categories are uniformly harmful and normatively ill-advised, regard-
less of whether they are done to remedy past structural race-based
discrimination or to address social inequality.161  As a result, race
should be presumptively irrelevant to government decisionmaking.
To the most fervent proponents of colorblindness on the Court, the
concept encompasses both a practical and moral dimension.  Accord-
ing to Justice Clarence Thomas: “The Constitution abhors classifica-
tions based on race, not only because those classifications can harm
favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because
every time the government places citizens on racial registers and
makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it de-
means us all.”162
The U.S. Supreme Court has struggled over the past forty years
to determine the role race should play in government decisionmaking,
yet it has incrementally adopted colorblindness as its primary norma-
tive framework.  Initially, the Court held that race could be consid-
ered to remedy past racial discrimination and applied this notion in a
few discrete areas: voting, employment, and education.163  However,
161 Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Under-
standing of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 208 (2010).
162 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting
a public law school’s consideration of race in admissions as the functional equivalent of a quota
to the extent that it did not allow for individual consideration and was therefore not narrowly
tailored to achieve educational diversity); see also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000)
(“One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the
dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and
essential qualities.”); Norton, supra note 161, at 208–09 (discussing the instrumentalist and moral
dimensions of the Court’s application of colorblindness).
163 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1980) (voting); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208–09 (1979) (employment); Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (education).
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beginning in the 1970s, the Court began to gradually restrict the use of
race-conscious policies as a means of correcting racial disparities.164
The Court was subsequently divided over whether to accept the
assumption of colorblindness that race should not be considered in
government decisionmaking.  Some Justices argued that much more
needed to be done before victory could be declared in the effort to
end racial discrimination.165  Others contended that we have achieved
a colorblind reality and that, “[i]n the eyes of government, we are just
one race here.  It is American.”166
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Court moved steadfastly towards
a colorblind approach to race-based classifications.  For example, in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,167 the Court rejected a municipal
program that required prime contractors on city-funded construction
projects to award at least thirty percent of the contract amount to mi-
nority-owned subcontractors.168  In so doing, the Court adopted strict
scrutiny as the default standard of review in racial discrimination
cases, regardless of whether the government action was intended to
remedy or perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race, and regard-
less of the race of those burdened or benefitted by the particular state
action.169  Six years later, in Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pen˜a,170 the
164 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976) (upholding a District of
Columbia police officer’s exam that disproportionately excluded African Americans from the
police force and holding that state action will not be considered unconstitutional solely because
it has a disparate impact upon certain racial groups; instead, the plaintiff must show discrimina-
tory intent); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973) (“[P]laintiffs must prove not only
that segregated schooling exists but also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional
state action.”); see also Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (“[E]ven if a
neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory
purpose.”).
165 See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 403 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“I yield to no one in my
earnest hope that the time will come when an ‘affirmative action’ program is unnecessary and is,
in truth, only a relic of the past.  I would hope that we could reach this state within a decade at
most.  But the story of Brown v. Board of Education, decided almost a quarter of a century ago,
suggests that that hope is a slim one.”) (citation omitted).
166 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 759 (2007) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (race-based classifications are “precisely the sort of government action that pits
the races against one another, exacerbates racial tension, and ‘provoke[s] resentment among
those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s use of race’” (quoting
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241)); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (“[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the
right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classi-
fication subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.”).
167 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
168 Id. at 500.
169 Id. at 493–94, 498–500; see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (“[A]ll racial classifications,
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Court examined a federal competitive bidding plan that provided in-
centives to government contractors to award subcontracts to small
businesses owned by “socially and economically disadvantaged indi-
viduals” such as racial minorities.171  In a five-to-four vote, the Court
remanded the case, holding that such race-based programs are subject
to strict scrutiny, even if they are meant to remedy the effects of past
discrimination.172
The Court’s acceptance of colorblindness has culminated in its
most recent decisions severely limiting the government’s ability to use
race-based classifications to address centuries of state-sanctioned ra-
cial discrimination.  In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Se-
attle School District No. 1,173 the Court held that race-conscious
policies are “extreme measure[s]” that are presumptively invalid.174
Justice Roberts famously concludes his opinion with the directive:
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discrim-
inating on the basis of race.”175  Most recently, in Ricci v. DeStefano,176
the Court, for the first time, ruled that a public employer’s decision to
acknowledge and address the racially disparate impact of its practices,
in this case a firefighter’s exam, was itself unlawful discrimination.177
This may portend a similar change in the Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence.178
C. Racial Pragmatism in the Court’s Jurisprudence
Many legal commentators over the years have noted a philosoph-
ical division on the Court regarding the role race should play in gov-
ernment decisionmaking.  The prevailing framework for capturing this
divide has been to cast the concerns motivating the Justices as cleaving
according to antisubordination and anticlassification interests.179
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a review-
ing court under strict scrutiny.”).
170 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
171 Id. at 200, 227.
172 Id. at 235–39.
173 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
174 Id. at 728.
175 Id. at 748.
176 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
177 Id. at 2681.
178 Id. at 2683 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he war between disparate impact and equal pro-
tection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about how—and on
what terms—to make peace between them.”).
179 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy and Com-
munity (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE L.J.
1353, 1382 (2005) (asserting that the Equal Protection Clause “creates a new substantive value of
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Those Justices who advance an antisubordination perspective under-
stand the Equal Protection Clause as prohibiting government actions
that, either by intent or effect, reinforce racial inequality.180  In addi-
tion, these Justices, whose views have most recently been represented
primarily in dissenting opinions, draw a distinction between laws that
seek to remedy and laws that seek to perpetuate racism.181  Thus, they
have consistently found that “[a]ctions designed to burden groups
long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with mea-
sures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its
aftereffects have been extirpated.”182  As a result, to these Justices,
race-conscious government actions that seek to advance the interests
of particular racial groups by addressing past state-sanctioned racial
discrimination or alleviating racial stratification should be constitu-
tionally permissible.183
The Justices who adhere to an anticlassification approach, on the
other hand, understand the Constitution as protecting individual and
not group interests, and therefore eschew state actions that involve
clustering people into racial categories.184  According to advocates of
this perspective: “[U]nder our Constitution there can be no such thing
as either a creditor or debtor race.  That concept is alien to the Consti-
tution’s focus upon the individual . . . and its rejection of dispositions
‘nonslavery’ and antisubordination to replace the old values of slavery and white supremacy”);
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: An-
tisubordination and Anticlassification in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1470, 1472–73 (2004).
180 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Equal Protection Clause,
ratified following the Civil War, has always distinguished in practice between state action that
excludes and thereby subordinates racial minorities and state action that seeks to bring together
people of all races.”).
181 Id. at 799 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] decision to exclude a member of a minority
because of his race is fundamentally different from a decision to include a member of a minority
for that reason.”); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is de-
signed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination.”); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 551–52 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A
profound difference separates governmental actions that themselves are racist, and governmen-
tal actions that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism or to prevent neutral governmental
activity from perpetuating the effects of such racism.”).
182 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
183 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution per-
mits local communities to adopt desegregation plans even where it does not require them to do
so.” (emphasis omitted)).
184 See Ian F. Haney Lo´pez, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 988 (2006–2007).
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based on race . . . .”185  Those on the Court who have championed this
view reject all racial classifications, and this anticlassification perspec-
tive has fueled the Court’s move towards colorblindness.186
This Section contends that focusing on these approaches pre-
cludes a full appreciation of the way the Court occasionally permits
some substantive forms of race-conscious decisionmaking by govern-
ment actors.  That is, some significant uses of race appear to the Court
to capture the social salience of race, while not producing or invoking
the gallery of harms that the Court attaches to other forms of race-
conscious decisionmaking.  Indeed, the Court has evinced the most
concern about the uses of race that group people into racial categories
without acknowledging individual differences within the group, or
what some scholars have referred to as “wooden racial classifica-
tions.”187  The Court has also expressed strong aversion to abstracting
from a racial category a set of assumptions about the entire group,
which leads to racial stereotyping, among other harms.188
Interestingly, despite finding that many uses of race carry these
harms, some Justices have simultaneously acknowledged that under
some circumstances, state actors can be race conscious and such race
consciousness is also normatively appropriate to the extent that it al-
lows the state to account for the social significance of race.  In these
cases, strict scrutiny will not be triggered, and hence there is no search
for a compelling interest that would justify the necessary evil of con-
sidering race.  Admittedly, those instances in the Court’s jurispru-
dence are rare.  However, they do signal a nuance that the Court has
brought to its analysis of race-conscious government action.
Some jurists apply racial pragmatist reasoning in a way that is
attentive to equality concerns.  Others, however, apply it in a more
retrograde manner.  The following Section illustrates this distinction
by examining where and when courts seem to embrace a sort of prag-
matism about race.  Then, Part IV demonstrates the ways in which
185 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
186 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Disfavoring a color-blind
interpretation of the Constitution, the dissent would give school boards a free hand to make
decisions on the basis of race—an approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists
in Brown v. Board of Education.  This approach is just as wrong today as it was a half century
ago.” (citation omitted)).
187 Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745,
1763–64 (1996) (describing how the Court rejects the use of “wooden racial classification[s]”).
188 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (excessive race-based reapportionment “re-
inforces the perception that members of the same racial group—regardless of their age, educa-
tion, economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls”).
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racial pragmatism can offer a useful framework for devising a more
equality-enhancing vision of the regulation of race in science.
1. Race as Additional Factor
Consider the Court’s racial gerrymandering line of cases.  These
cases raise the question of whether state legislators who redraw voting
lines can do so in a race-conscious manner.  A particularly interesting
aspect of these cases is the way the Court adjudicates issues regarding
the extent to which race can be considered without triggering strict
scrutiny review.
Redistricting or reapportionment involves state legislatures
redrawing electoral districts in response to the data obtained from the
decennial census.189  Normally, political gerrymandering is subject to
rational basis review.190  However, this process can implicate equal
protection concerns if the “reapportionment plan rationally cannot be
understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into
separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient
justification.”191
In a series of cases, beginning with Shaw v. Reno,192 plaintiffs
challenged state redistricting plans, yet they did not argue that the
facially neutral redistricting decisions were made with a discrimina-
tory purpose (to disenfranchise a particular group) or that that their
right to vote was diluted.193  Rather their argument was that race-con-
scious redistricting itself violated their right to participate in a “color-
blind” electoral process194 and led to alleged “representational
harms,” to the extent that the redrawn districts “convey the message
that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial.”195  Under
equal protection analysis, such race-conscious decisionmaking by leg-
islatures would trigger strict scrutiny review and require a compelling
justification by government actors.196  In these cases, however, the
Court employed racial pragmatist reasoning to identify three factors
189 See id. at 633.
190 See supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing the application of rational basis
review to classifications other than gender or race).
191 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 652; see also Terry Smith, Autonomy Versus Equality: Voting Rights
Rediscovered, 57 ALA. L. REV. 261, 274–75 (2005).
192 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1992).
193 See Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1162 (1998).
194 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641.
195 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996).
196 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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that influence whether the invocation of race in the reapportionment
process will be subject to strict scrutiny.
The question before the Court in Shaw v. Reno was whether leg-
islative redistricting measures designed to benefit particular racial
groups create a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment.197
The Court held that a claim of excessive racial gerrymandering was
indeed subject to equal protection analysis.198  Although the decision
was criticized rightfully as overly restrictive and, at first glance, ap-
peared to impose a rigid norm of colorblindness, the Court expressed
racial pragmatist concerns to the extent that it ruled that, while draw-
ing district lines, legislatures must necessarily exercise a degree of race
consciousness.199  Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor declared
it “antithetical to our system of representative democracy” when “a
district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common
interests of one racial group,” yet she nevertheless found that “the
legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it
is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion,
and a variety of other demographic factors.  That sort of race con-
sciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible racial discrimina-
tion.”200  Thus, when race is one among many factors, rather than
employed by itself as a sufficient factor, the consideration of race in
redistricting may be constitutionally acceptable.
Two years later, in Miller v. Johnson,201 Justice O’Connor opined
in a concurrence that “even though race may well have been consid-
ered in the redistricting process,” such an invocation of race should
not trigger strict scrutiny so long as “States have drawn the boundaries
in accordance with their customary districting principles,”202 such as
“compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions.”203  In
addition, the Court held that strict scrutiny would be applied only
where “race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s
decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a
particular district.”204  This exacting standard requires more than a
demonstration simply that the legislature “committed from the outset
to creating majority-minority districts,” or “manipulated district lines”
197 See id. at 633–34, 642.
198 See id. at 649.
199 See id. at 642.
200 Id. at 646, 648.
201 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
202 Id. at 928–29 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
203 Id. at 916 (majority opinion).
204 Id.
2012] THE REGULATION OF RACE IN SCIENCE 1155
to achieve its race-conscious goals, or “substantially neglected tradi-
tional districting criteria.”205  According to the “predominant motive”
standard, race must be the driving factor in the legislative linedrawing
process for strict scrutiny to be invoked.206
In Easley v. Cromartie,207 for example, the Court was asked to
decide whether the North Carolina legislature relied upon “race rather
than politics” in the drawing of a congressional district.208  Although
race played a significant role in the legislature’s redistricting efforts,
the Court held that the legislature’s race-conscious decisionmaking
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because race was not the
predominant factor in the redistricting.209  In so doing, the Court
noted the “undisputed evidence that racial identification is highly cor-
related with political affiliation in North Carolina,” as whites regis-
tered as Democrats crossed party lines to vote Republican more often
than African Americans, who registered and voted Democratic be-
tween ninety-five percent and ninety-seven percent of the time.210  As
a result, according to the Court, those involved in the redistricting
process can take account of race to capture political affiliation.211
Despite the Court’s avowed colorblind and anticlassification con-
cerns that allowing states to engage in race-based reapportionment
may reinforce “the perception that members of the same racial
group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which they live—think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls,”212 it has
nonetheless recognized that race consciousness in this context does
not necessarily cause these stereotyping harms, and, in so doing, has
adopted a racial pragmatist perspective regarding the significance of
race in American political life.
The Court implicitly acknowledges that the United States re-
mains a highly segregated society and that the gerrymandering exer-
cise will account for that.213  The Court also implicitly appreciates that
205 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 962 (1996) (observing that any one of these factors is not
“independently sufficient to require strict scrutiny,” even though together they “weigh in favor
of the application of strict scrutiny”); see also Foster, supra note 193, at 1166–67 (observing that
“race-consciousness does not automatically prove constitutionally problematic”).
206 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
207 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
208 Id. at 243.
209 See id. at 243–44.
210 Id. at 243–45.
211 Id. at 245.
212 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1992).
213 See Easley, 532 U.S. at 243.
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voters often cast ballots along racial lines, due in large part to their
social experience of race or racial discrimination.214  In addition, the
Court recognizes that legislators are inevitably conscious of the deep
and real connections between political affiliation and race.215  This
awareness that drives racial pragmatist reasoning tempers the Court’s
colorblind impulse.  Indeed, while the application of strict scrutiny to
explicit racial classifications is based in part on the presumption that
race is not relevant to government decisionmaking, in the racial redis-
tricting context, a majority of Justices agree that race is relevant and
may be invoked in the creation of majority-minority districts without
necessarily raising constitutional concerns.216
2. Race as Descriptive Factor
As the previous Section demonstrated, in the voting rights con-
text, racial pragmatist reasoning creates a space for race-conscious
decisionmaking that appreciates the reality of racial stratification and
the social experience of race.  There are, however, some contexts in
which the application of racial pragmatism can be more regressive.
Race-based suspect identification represents one such example.
Although racial profiling by law enforcement has been broadly
condemned as illegitimate and constitutionally suspect,217 courts have
uniformly accepted the practice of identifying criminal suspects based
upon their race.218  Racial profiling involves inferring a connection be-
tween an individual and a particular criminal offense based upon gen-
eralizations about the characteristics or behavior of others of the same
racial group.219  Criminal suspect identification, on the other hand, in-
214 See id. at 245.
215 See id.; see also, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958–59 (1996); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646.
216 See Foster, supra note 193, at 1165–66.
217 See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 50 (1999); RANDALL L. KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 162 (1997);
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 257 (1983).
218 See United States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that police may
consider race in stopping a person if a criminal suspect’s description includes a racial identifica-
tion); Buffkins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465, 467–68 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that the detention
of a black woman at an airport did not amount to racial discrimination under § 1981 because
“her race matched the racial description of the person described in the tip,” which was only that
“a black person or persons arriving on a flight from Denver” would be carrying cocaine).  The
practice of race-based suspect identification is considered by many legal commentators to be a
legitimate use of race. See COLE, supra note 217, at 50; KENNEDY, supra note 217, at 150; John-
son, supra note 217, at 242–43.  The practice does, however, have its critics. See R. Richard
Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse,
48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1096 (2001).
219 See Banks, supra note 218, at 1081.
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volves a physical description of a perpetrator of a crime elicited by law
enforcement from either a victim or witness to the criminal event.220
Law enforcement today routinely relies upon both practices, and
although state and lower federal courts have held that racial profiling
may violate the Equal Protection Clause,221 when presented with a
challenge to the use of a race-based suspect description, they have
consistently evaded the issue by concluding that the official use of ra-
cial categories in this context is appropriate.222  The Supreme Court
has indicated in dicta that racial profiling warrants strict scrutiny re-
view,223 but it has never suggested that race-based suspect descriptions
are “racial classifications” that implicate equal protection concerns.
This is so notwithstanding the fact that the practice raises an-
tisubordination, anticlassification, and colorblindness concerns.224  The
use of race-based suspect classifications, like racial profiling, involves
the intentional invocation of race by state actors and has the potential
to disparately burden members of racial minority populations who
have committed no wrongdoing.225  In Brown v. City of Oneonta,226 for
example, the Second Circuit presided over a case in which an at-
tempted assault victim described her assailant to police as a young,
black male with a cut on his hand.227  Over the next five days, police
officers detained for questioning and physical inspection every black
person, male or female, they could locate in and around the city of
Oneonta, New York, beginning with students at Oneonta Univer-
sity.228  During this sweep, the police pulled over cars with black occu-
220 See id.
221 See, e.g., Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 635 (7th Cir. 2001); Flowers v. Fiore,
239 F. Supp. 2d 173, 178 (D.R.I. 2003).
222 See, e.g., Waldon, 206 F.3d at 604 (“Common sense dictates that, when determining
whom to approach as a suspect of criminal wrongdoing, a police officer may legitimately con-
sider race as a factor if descriptions of the perpetrator known to the officer include race.”); State
v. Ampey, 609 P.2d 96, 97 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (race properly used as an “identifying character-
istic”); see also Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 333–34 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v.
Davis, 200 F.3d 1053, 1054 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481, 1487
(10th Cir. 1994); Cartnail v. State, 753 A.2d 519, 530 (Md. 2000).
223 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We of course agree . . . that the
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.”).
224 See, e.g., David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While
Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 298–305 (1999).
225 See Banks, supra note 218, at 1080.
226 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000).
227 Id. at 334 (The victim told the police “that she could not identify her assailant’s face, but
that he was wielding a knife; that he was a black man, based on her view of his hand and fore-
arm; and that he was young, because of the speed with which he crossed her room . . . [and] that,
as they struggled, the suspect had cut himself on the hand with the knife.”).
228 Id.
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pants, obtained a list of all black students at the university, and even
prevented black people from boarding public transportation unless
and until they provided identification.229  In the end, more than two
hundred black people were detained and questioned, but no suspect
was apprehended.230  Despite these facts, the Second Circuit ulti-
mately held that no equal protection violation had occurred as a result
of the police actions,231 and the Supreme Court denied a petition for
certiorari.232
As Brown v. City of Oneonta demonstrates, race-based suspect
descriptions appear to be racial classifications to the extent that law
enforcement procedures require the collection of race data from wit-
nesses, law enforcement virtually always delimits searches by race,
and such searches can disparately burden innocent members of minor-
ity groups.233  Nevertheless, courts have uniformly held that the reli-
ance upon racial categories by law enforcement in this context does
not require equal protection strict scrutiny, and this determination
seems to be driven by racial pragmatist considerations.
First, the use of race in suspect identifications appears not to raise
equal protection concerns because race is offered as one among sev-
eral elements in the suspect description, and therefore race is not the
sole or predominant identifying characteristic.234  Second, courts have
found that the use of racial categories in this context is constitutionally
unproblematic because race is understood as appropriately describing
or correlating with some underlying social reality.235  Thus, this use of
229 Id. at 334, 340–41.
230 Id. at 340–41.
231 Id. at 341.
232 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 534 U.S. 816 (2001).
233 See Banks, supra note 218, at 1109–12.
234 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (finding “no constitu-
tional violation” when motorists near the border are singled out by law enforcement “largely on
the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry”); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–89
(1975) (same); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 722–28 (1969) (upholding detention and finger-
printing of black suspect when “[t]he victim could give no better description of her assailant than
that he was a Negro youth”); Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 390 (4th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (holding that “[t]he use of race was but one ‘pertinent ele-
ment’ or characteristic of the suspect” and further noting that “[b]ecause the description of the
assailant included being a young-looking black male, it is no surprise that the officers’ investiga-
tion almost certainly produced a disparate but incidental impact on young, black males, even
though the purpose of the investigation was to target neither African-Americans nor males”);
Brown, 221 F.3d at 337–38 (“This description [of the suspect] contained not only race, but also
gender and age, as well as the possibility of a cut on the hand.”).
235 See Banks, supra note 218, at 1092–93; see also Brown, 221 F. 3d at 337 (“They were
questioned on the altogether legitimate basis of a physical description given by the victim of a
crime.”); Cartnail v. State, 753 A.2d 519, 530 (Md. 2000) (“In looking at the description of the
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racial categories does not implicate the Court’s colorblindness ap-
proach and trigger strict scrutiny review.236
Although reliance upon race in a suspect identification may seem
intuitive or natural, the fact that race is a fundamental part of suspect
identifications is due largely to the immense relevance of race in
American society.  Individuals do not simply notice race, but rather
are socialized to “recognize” and categorize the combination of physi-
cal, cultural, and linguistic traits historically associated with particular
racialized groups in the United States, despite the fact that one’s race
isn’t always obvious, unambiguous, or transparent.  Indeed, according
to Professor R. Richard Banks:
Race is salient, memorable, and useful because of its cultural
and social significance.  Other possible suspect description
components are less salient, memorable, and useful because
they are less socially and culturally significant . . . .  We per-
ceive what we are trained and motivated to perceive.  Visual
perception operates within culture, not outside of it.237
Relying upon skin color in a suspect description, for example,
might group many African Americans, Native Australians, and some
South Asians into one category, while using hair texture as a
descriptor might produce differences among and within these same
groups.238  Race, in contrast, captures particular combinations of phys-
ical and cultural features that have particular social significance in the
United States at a specific historical moment.239  Thus, the judicial ac-
ceptance of race-based suspect identifications, notwithstanding that
the reliance on race in this context is susceptible to abuse and error,
appears to be a nod by courts to the sociocultural singularity and
prominence of race in America.
Advocates of the antisubordination perspective may be appropri-
ately concerned about the state eliciting and relying upon race-based
suspect descriptions in a way that burdens minority populations,240
and the anticlassification or colorblindness proponent may object to
suspects, undoubtedly physical characteristics, such as race, gender, ethnicity, hair color, facial
features, age, body build, or apparel of a suspect permits winnowing of innocent travelers.”).
236 A frequent critique of racial profiling, however, is that the practice relies upon invidious
stereotypes. See Harris, supra note 224, at 292–93.
237 Banks, supra note 218, at 1111.  According to Professor Banks, we focus most on race in
suspect identifications because “it is race rather than physical features that predominates in the
development and use of suspect descriptions.” Id. at 1112.
238 See id. at 1111.
239 See id.
240 See supra notes 224-39 and accompanying text.
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any official use of racial categories.241  According to racial pragmatist
reasoning, however, this practice acknowledges the social reality of
race in order to further a legitimate law enforcement objective, while
avoiding the group-based pejorative stereotypes that demand equal
protection analysis.
Brown v. City of Oneonta vividly illustrates the ways in which
racial pragmatism can be problematically applied.  The next Section
demonstrates how jurists can employ racial pragmatist reasoning in a
way that is more attentive to social justice concerns.
3. Race as Necessary Means
Even where the use of race carries the type of harms that trigger
strict scrutiny (i.e., a racial classification), we can still find strands of
racial pragmatist reasoning in the Justices’ opinions.  We see this most
in the education context.  Despite the fact that strict scrutiny is typi-
cally applied in these cases, the Court nonetheless finds that some
government race consciousness—that which accounts for the social sa-
lience of race, yet does not invoke the gallery of harms with which a
majority of the Court is so deeply concerned—can survive strict
scrutiny.
For instance, despite her general opposition to state reliance
upon racial categories in the distribution of benefits and burdens,242
Justice O’Connor nevertheless cast the definitive vote in Grutter v.
Bollinger,243 where the Court upheld a public law school’s considera-
tion of race as a “‘plus’ factor” for applicants in the admissions pro-
cess as a means of increasing racial diversity.244  Her opinion for the
Court betrays a racial pragmatist perspective, as according to Justice
O’Connor, “[j]ust as growing up in a particular region or having par-
ticular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views,
so too is one’s own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a
society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters.”245
241 See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
242 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995).
243 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
244 Id. at 334, 343.
245 Id. at 333.  Similarly, in Adarand, while holding that the federal government’s policies
encouraging the provision of subcontracts to minority-owned firms would be subject to strict
scrutiny, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion still openly recognizes that “[t]he unhappy persis-
tence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority
groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
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Justice Kennedy eloquently articulated racial pragmatist reason-
ing most recently in his concurring opinion in Parents Involved.246  Jus-
tice Kennedy voted with the majority to strike down a school district’s
consideration of race as a factor in students’ school assignments, based
on his determination that the practice created race-based classifica-
tions.247  Still, his concurring opinion, which claimed at least five votes,
evinces a decidedly racial pragmatist conviction.  According to Justice
Kennedy: “The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the real-
ity is that too often it does.”248
Acknowledging that race consciousness is sometimes necessary to
overcome the contemporary consequences of the nation’s long history
of racial discrimination, Justice Kennedy observed:
The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate inter-
est government has in ensuring all people have equal oppor-
tunity regardless of their race.  The plurality’s postulate that
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race” is not sufficient to
decide these cases.249
According to Justice Kennedy:
The statement by Justice Harlan that “[o]ur Constitution is
color-blind” was most certainly justified in the context of his
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.  The Court’s decision in that
case was a grievous error it took far too long to overrule.
Plessy, of course, concerned official classification by race ap-
plicable to all persons who sought to use railway carriages.
And, as an aspiration, Justice Harlan’s axiom must command
our assent.  In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it can-
not be a universal constitutional principle.250
Justice Kennedy’s support for some state efforts that rely on race-
conscious decisionmaking is a recognition that acknowledging the so-
cial significance of race is often a necessary means of achieving partic-
ular racial justice ends.251  Thus, his analysis reflects the fundamental
interests of racial pragmatism with respect to government actions that
rely upon racial classifications.252  Justice Kennedy believes that gov-
246 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787–88 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
247 Id. at 782–87.
248 Id. at 787.
249 Id. at 787–88 (citation omitted).
250 Id. at 788 (citation omitted).
251 Id. at 782–98.
252 Id.
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ernment decisionmakers should remain “free to devise race-conscious
measures to address the problem in a general way,” yet holds that
they must do so “without treating each student in different fashion
solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.”253  To
achieve this objective, he articulates a broad scheme of concrete, race-
conscious mechanisms that “do not lead to different treatment based
on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by
race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be
found permissible.”254
Despite Kennedy’s decision to vote with the majority to strike
down the policy, his concurring opinion’s racial pragmatist reasoning
complicates the Court’s inclination towards colorblindness and illumi-
nates the nuances of the Court’s normative commitments with respect
to state race-conscious decisionmaking.
IV. RACIAL PRAGMATISM AND REGULATING THE USE OF RACE
IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
As has been shown, the Court has identified a set of harms that it
believes accompany the use of race—harms which can vary with the
context, the ways in which race is used (as a variable versus the sole
category), and other factors.  The Court has also mapped some princi-
ples to guide the use of race in government decisionmaking.  These
principles occasionally appear to hew closely to a commitment to col-
orblindness (or anticlassification) and other times to a more racial
pragmatist view of the role of race in our society and its implications
for government decisionmaking.  This Part applies these principles to
the current uses of race in biomedical research as a means of illustrat-
ing how adoption of racial pragmatist principles may allow the NIH
and FDA to mandate the use of racial categories in biomedical studies
in a way that promotes better science and health care.
A. Why Race Is Still Relevant in Biomedical Research
By permitting researchers to employ race as a proxy for geo-
graphic ancestry, notwithstanding that there are no meaningful ge-
netic differences among the races, the NIH Revitalization Act and the
FDA rules have enabled, if not encouraged, researchers to use racial
253 Id. at 788–89.
254 Id. at 789.  These mechanisms include “strategic site selection of new schools; drawing
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating re-
sources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking
enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.” Id.
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categories in just the ways that the Supreme Court condemns.255  In
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, for example, the Court rejected a
policy that used race as a proxy for social and economic disadvan-
tage.256  In so doing, the Court made clear that this use of racial classi-
fications will be subject to strict scrutiny review.257  The Court’s
concern about the use of race as a proxy is likely based upon its con-
cern about the official reliance upon harmful generalizations or ste-
reotypes.  The Court has consistently sought to prohibit state actors
from placing individuals into rigid race boxes out of which they cannot
climb because the state is treating them as if all individuals inside the
box share the same characteristics (and vulnerabilities), while mem-
bers of the majority group not in the box share the same characteris-
tics (and advantages).  The Court has declared that “[s]tereotyping,
which treats individuals on the basis of group generalizations that
might not apply to any particular individual, perhaps represents the
paradigmatic harm that antidiscrimination law, including [the] Equal
Protection Clause, is thought to guard against.”258
NIH and FDA rules invite the now-frequent practice among bi-
omedical researchers of grouping people who share certain visible
characteristics into inflexible race boxes in a way that overlooks dif-
ferences within the groups, and then making baseless generalizations
about the particular health traits that the individuals in the group are
presumed to possess due to their membership in the group.  For in-
stance, in the case of BiDil, the FDA approved the drug despite the
fact that there was no clear evidence to support the belief that BiDil
worked better or differently in self-described African Americans than
in other populations.259  At the FDA approval hearing for BiDil,
Steven Nissen, the hearing chair, declared that the effect of BiDil on
self-identified African Americans was enough to satisfy what he called
“biological plausibility,” and until a genetic marker could be identified
for individual differences in drug responses, race could serve as a suf-
ficient surrogate.260  This belief was shared by others.  As one re-
255 See Amar & Katyal, supra note 187, at 1763 (describing how the Court rejects the use of
“wooden racial classification[s]”).
256 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 204–05 (1995).
257 Id. at 227 (“[A]ll racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local gov-
ernmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
258 Banks, supra note 218, at 1091–92.
259 See supra notes 91–103 and accompanying text.
260 2 Transcript of June 16, 2005 Meeting at 359–60, Food & Drug Admin., Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Res., Cardiovascular & Renal Drugs Advisory Committee, http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/ac/05/transcripts/2005-4145T2.pdf.
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searcher opined: “Using race is a blunt instrument for identifying
those who respond to the drug, but it’s the best tool we have right
now . . . [therefore, i]t’s appropriate that BiDil is targeted at a particu-
lar population group.  Further research will likely identify the basis for
the effectiveness observed in African-Americans.”261
1. Race, Health, and the New “Social Darwinism”
The NIH and FDA rules that encourage the use of race as a proxy
for genetics burden minority communities in many ways.  Scientifi-
cally unfounded generalizations that connect race, genetics, and dis-
ease have led some physicians to treat their patients differently
because of the erroneous belief that there may be genetic differences
among racial populations.262  A national survey of physicians con-
ducted after the release of BiDil revealed that 81% believed that race
should be used as a “biological basis for determining ailments or dis-
eases.”263  Similarly, the author of a Boston Globe article on NitroMed
wrote: “Researchers theorize that BiDil works better among blacks
because their bodies lack enough nitric oxide.”264  The concern is that
physicians may interpret the advent of BiDil or other such drugs as
evidence that race has independent genetic explanatory power and
then harm their patients by rendering diagnostic decisions about a pa-
tient’s potential illness, disease, or treatment response based upon the
patient’s race.
History is rife with grim examples of such racial stereotypes in the
biomedical research context.  Just as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study re-
searchers believed that syphilis was a different disease in African
Americans than whites, some researchers during the height of the
HIV/AIDS crisis believed that the disease progressed differently
among African Americans as compared to other groups, and that this
might be explained by race-based genetic or biological variations.265
261 Dutton, supra note 2, at 43 (quoting Dr. Mario Ehlers, Chief Medical Officer of Pacific
Biometrics).
262 See, e.g., Sally Satel, I Am a Racially Profiling Doctor, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 5, 2002,
at 56 (claiming that “[w]hen it comes to practicing medicine, stereotyping often works”).
263 Reverby, supra note 95, at 482.
264 Diedtra Henderson, Distrust Overshadows Drug’s Promise, BOSTON GLOBE, May 16,
2005, at C1; see also Ronald Bailey, Commentary, When Medicine That Discriminates Is Good:
Using Race and Ethnicity to Improve Health Care Is Anything But Racist, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec.
18, 2005, at 2B (asserting that “blacks tend to have lower average amounts of nitric oxide”);
Nicolas Wade, Race-Based Medicine Continued . . ., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, at 12 (“BiDil is
designed to increase levels of a chemical signal known as nitric oxide, which tends to be lower in
Africans, possibly because low levels help retain salt for people living in hot climates.”).
265 Richard E. Chaisson et al., Race, Sex, Drug Use, and Progression of Human Immu-
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Eventually, they came to understand that the virulence of the disease
in this population was related to socioeconomic conditions, including
limited access to health care, which exacerbated the effects of the
disease.266
Current federal laws endow race with a false genetic essentialism,
which further harms minority populations to the extent that their un-
derlying health conditions are no longer understood as potentially at-
tributable to their place in the economic or social world, but are rather
explained exclusively as resulting from their molecular constitution.267
Indeed, today, there are a number of significant health disparities
among racial groups that have a crippling effect on their ability to
enjoy the full benefits of citizenship.  According to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s 2010 national health report, the in-
fant mortality rate for African Americans is up to three times higher
than that of other races;268 blacks die of heart disease much more
often than whites and die at younger ages;269 blacks, Hispanics, and
American Indians, whether straight or gay, have higher rates of HIV
infection than whites, while Asians had the lowest rates of infection;270
life expectancy for blacks lags behind that of whites by 4.8 years;271 the
mortality rate is 29% higher for blacks than for whites;272 the age-
adjusted death rate for the black population exceeds that for the white
nodeficiency Virus Disease, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 751, 751 (1995) [hereinafter Chaisson, Race,
Sex, Drug Use] (“The differences in survival between blacks and whites, men and women, and
drug users and those who do not use drugs have led to speculation that HIV disease progresses
more rapidly in some demographic groups than in others.”); Richard E. Chaisson et al., Racial
Heterogeneity of HIV Antigenemia in People with HIV Infection, 5 AIDS 177, 179–80 (1991)
[hereinafter Chaisson, Racial Heterogeneity] (reporting that black HIV patients had different
levels of a certain antigen in their blood than whites and concluding that “it is possible that racial
differences” result in different immune responses to HIV in blacks and whites).
266 Chaisson, Race, Sex, Drug Use, supra note 265, at 754 (“Our results provide strong
evidence that earlier reports of differences in survival were a result of inadequate medical care
rather than biologic differences in the natural history of HIV infection.”); Richard D. Moore et
al., Racial Differences in the Use of Drug Therapy for HIV Disease in an Urban Community, 330
NEW ENG. J. MED. 763, 767 (1994) (concluding that “our results indicate that blacks may not
have the same access as whites to recommended therapeutic care”); Richard M. Selik et al.,
Racial/Ethnic Differences in the Risk of AIDS in the United States, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1539,
1541 (1988) (“[T]he higher risks of AIDS in Blacks and Hispanics are due primarily to behav-
ioral and perhaps environmental differences between the racial/ethnic groups, rather than ge-
netic differences.”).
267 See supra Part II.A–B.
268 NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2010, at 147–48 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus10.pdf.
269 Id. at 176–78.
270 See id. at 196–98.
271 Id. at 152.
272 See id. at 153.
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population by 49% for stroke (cerebrovascular disease), 31% for
heart disease, 21% for cancer, 108% for diabetes, and 810% for HIV
disease;273 and diabetes is more prevalent among blacks and Mexican
Americans than other groups.274
Once the health problems of a minority population are defined as
genetic, they become an innately personal concern, rather than a so-
cial or collective issue, and much less a residual effect of the United
States’s legacy of state-sanctioned, race-based discrimination.  This
changes not only the social meaning of a health condition in the racial-
ized group, but also shifts responsibility for the condition onto the in-
dividual and away from the collective.  This undermines attempts to
address the environmental or socioeconomic causes of the negative
health outcomes experienced by minority populations, as well as ef-
forts to devise and fund systemic solutions.  In the same way that the
Social Darwinists of the past relied upon science to support their posi-
tion that social programs aimed at elevating the status of the poor and
racial minorities contradicted their natural condition,275 so too may
some policymakers today fail to fully address health conditions that
disproportionately affect communities of color in the belief that they
emerge from one’s genes rather than from society.276
2. Racial Discrimination and Health Disparities
Some of the serious health disparities experienced by minority
populations may be attributed to demographic variables such as in-
come or education.  Others, however, can be traced directly to the
experience of discrimination.  For example, rates of high blood pres-
sure for African Americans are double those of whites.277  Curiously,
African Americans, who are descended primarily from western and
central Africans, are prone to hypertension, despite the fact that their
273 See id. at 156.
274 See id. at 228.
275 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
276 For example, as sociologist Troy Duster has noted, researchers have spent years search-
ing for a genetic basis for the high rates of chronic conditions such as alcoholism among Native
Americans. See Troy Duster, Comparative Perspectives and Competing Explanations: Taking on
the Newly Configured Reductionist Challenge to Sociology, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 3 (2006). While
this appears to be a laudable goal, in reality, such efforts not only pathologize Native Americans,
but may also divert needed research time and funds from examining the ways in which centuries
of mistreatment and oppression, high unemployment, geographic displacement and isolation,
and other aspects of Native Americans’ general disenfranchisement may affect their consump-
tion of alcohol. Id.
277 See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 268, at 268–69.
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African ancestors were not.278  And researchers found that rates of
hypertension differ even within the African American population, as
darker-skinned blacks have on average higher blood pressure than
lighter-skinned blacks.279  The researchers who conducted this seminal
epidemiological study ultimately determined that the differential in
rates of hypertension is not due to race as a genetically distinct factor
in disease development, but rather to the fact that having a dark skin
color in the United States renders one subject to more social stresses
and fewer social and economic resources than those with lighter skin
color.280
Numerous studies demonstrate that racial discrimination and
race-related stress negatively impact health, including the onset, pro-
gression, and severity of illness or disease.281  The effects of racial dis-
crimination and race-related stress have been linked to the
development of certain cancers and health problems manifest in the
neuroendocrine, cardiovascular, and immune systems.282  Racial dis-
crimination and race-related stress also have been shown to affect
pain sensitivity and chronic pain, low birth weight, and BMI/obesity.283
Today, race remains at the root of much discrimination in the United
States, and many racial minority populations continue to suffer the
effects of the nation’s long history of racial discrimination.  Studies
have demonstrated that even after controlling for socioeconomic fac-
tors, members of racial minority groups experience higher levels of
278 Dutton, supra note 2, at 43.
279 Clarence C. Gravlee et al., Skin Color, Social Classification, and Blood Pressure in
Southeastern Puerto Rico, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2191, 2191 (2005).
280 Id. at 2194; see also Troy Duster, Race and Reification in Science, 307 SCIENCE 1050,
1050 (2005) (noting the “complex feedback loop and interaction effect” between skin color and
health); Dutton, supra note 2, at 41 (“The prevalence for biological-based conditions is 2.5 times
higher among African-Americans than among those with European ancestry and is based upon
the relative harshness of the environment.”); Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retalia-
tion, and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529, 546–48 (2003) (discussing
the health effects on African Americans of stress caused by racial discrimination).
281 See David R. Williams & Selina A. Mohammed, Discrimination and Racial Disparities
in Health: Evidence and Needed Research, 32 J. BEHAV. MED. 20, 27 (2009); see also Elizabeth
Brondolo et al., Race, Racism and Health: Disparities, Mechanisms, and Interventions, 32 J.
BEHAV. MED. 20, 21 (2009); Yin Paradies, A Systematic Review of Empirical Research on Self-
Reported Racism and Health, 35 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 888, 891–92 (2006).
282 Shawn O. Utsey et al., Effect of Ethnic Group Membership on Ethnic Identity, Race-
Related Stress, and Quality of Life, 8 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 366,
368 (2002).
283 See Williams & Mohammed, supra note 281, at 27; see also Brondolo et al., supra note
281, at 1; Paradies, supra note 281, at 891–92.
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race-related stress than whites, and African Americans experience the
most elevated stress rates.284
Although some of the health disparities between whites and ra-
cial minorities may correlate with other social factors, such as income
or education, they cannot be attributed to these factors alone.285  The
risk factors that affect the development of particular diseases are
rarely single-locus, but instead are often very complex, involving many
genetic and environmental influences.286  Hence, the experience of ra-
cism may impact health in a way that is distinct from other social and
economic indicators.  Indeed, the aggregate effects of a life’s worth of
racially informed experiences may result in specific physiological re-
sponses that are not determined by genetic differences among racial
groups and are irreducible to other demographic factors or vari-
ables.287  Thus, a combination of genetic, environmental, and socioeco-
nomic factors, including the effects of racial discrimination, may
together yield physiologically discernible effects, including differences
in overall health status and rates of disease incidence and prevalence,
morbidity, and mortality.
B. Operationalizing Racial Pragmatism in the Biomedical
Research Context
The government must continue to mandate the use of race as a
variable in biomedical research, yet it must do so in a way that does
not encourage researchers to uncritically attribute differences in dis-
ease progression, or drug or therapy response, to biological or genetic
notions of race.  The NIH guidelines currently provide little guidance
on how and when the use of racial categories is warranted.288  This has
caused problems of such significance that, in 2001, an editor of the
New England Journal of Medicine recommended that all biomedical
journals require authors who make racial or ethnic distinctions to
“furnish a scientifically valid definition of the population under study”
as a criterion for publication.289  Similarly, since 2000, the journal Na-
284 See Deidre Franklin-Jackson & Robert T. Carter, The Relationships Between Race-Re-
lated Stress, Racial Identity, and Mental Health for Black Americans, 33 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 5, 6
(2007); Hope Landrine et al., Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnic Discrimination in Health
Research, 29 J. BEHAV. MED. 79, 79, 88 (2006); Utsey et al., supra note 282, at 368.
285 See BROOKS & KING, supra note 126, at 7–8.
286 Dutton, supra note 2, at 43.
287 See Ossorio & Duster, supra note 77, at 119; NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NAT’L INST. ON
AGING, HEALTH DISPARITIES STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2009–2013, http://www.nia.nih.
gov/about/health-disparities-strategic-plan-fiscal-years-2009-2013.
288 See NIH Guidelines, supra note 58, at 14,510.
289 Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1393.
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ture Genetics has required authors to “explain why they make use of
particular ethnic groups or populations, and how classification was
achieved.”290
This Section demonstrates the ways in which racial pragmatist
considerations can provide a framework for how researchers can em-
ploy racial categories in biomedical studies without jeopardizing
health, producing flawed science, or reinforcing pernicious, anti-
quated, and stigmatizing conceptions of racial difference.
1. Race as a Necessary Means
Federal rules must enable the practical use of race in scientific
studies, yet not in a way that leads to the normatively and constitu-
tionally suspect “racial profiling” that can harm minority populations
by allowing researchers to suggest that people who look a certain way
share a similar genetic profile.  Here, the application of racial pragma-
tist reasoning from the education and voting rights contexts is
instructive.
As Justice Kennedy opined in Parents Involved, race conscious-
ness is often a necessary means of addressing the consequences of ra-
cial discrimination.291  However, state actors cannot employ racial
categories in a way that tells an individual that “he or she is to be
defined by race,” as was the case in the BiDil episode.292  This ap-
proach is illustrated in the Court’s voting rights jurisprudence, where
the Court makes clear that legislatures may consider race in the redis-
tricting process as a means of capturing political affiliation because
one’s social experience of racism and racial discrimination affects how
one is likely to vote.293  Implicit in the Court’s racial pragmatist rea-
soning is a recognition that race is as much a social process as a social
fact.294  In keeping with this truism, in the biomedical research con-
text, race should be taken into account as a means of capturing the
causes of the health differentials that exist among racial groups, be-
cause one’s social experience of racism and racial discrimination af-
fects health outcomes.
290 Editorial, Census, Race and Science, 24 NATURE GENETICS 97, 97–98 (2000).
291 See supra notes 246–53 and accompanying text.
292 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
293 See supra Part III.C.1.
294 In her opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Justice O’Connor also recog-
nized that, “[j]ust as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional exper-
iences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique experience of being a
racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters.” Id. at 333.
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Indeed, the NIH and FDA rules must make clear that race repre-
sents a complex amalgamation of social processes that can have physi-
ological effects.  Race is part of a fluid and dynamic feedback loop
according to which social factors can drive biological outcomes that
have social consequences.  Thus, the FDA and NIH rules must ensure
that researchers are self-consciously aware of the constructed nature
of race, and acknowledge it as a socially manufactured identity maker,
while recognizing racism as an interactive process that can inflict
harms that manifest biologically.  This understanding of race as a con-
struct and a process will not only preclude researchers from employ-
ing race as a biological or genetic category in biomedical research, but
will also enable researchers to more clearly identify and articulate
how and why race is being utilized in their studies.
2. Race as Descriptive Factor
When determining how race will be assigned in biomedical stud-
ies, researchers can employ either closed racial designations (e.g.,
black, African American, Afro Caribbean; white, European Ameri-
can, etc.) or open-ended descriptions (providing a limitless range of
racial identity options by allowing individuals to choose how to iden-
tify themselves).  In making the decision of which type of designation
to adopt, racial pragmatist reasoning from the criminal suspect identi-
fication context can provide guidance.
Courts’ determinations that race may be used in identifying a sus-
pect are based, in part, on a tacit understanding that, due to the social
significance of race in the United States, most individuals in this coun-
try have been socialized to recognize the combination of physical, cul-
tural, and linguistic traits historically associated with particular
racialized groups.295  Although one’s racial identification is not always
self-evident to an observer, and racial categories can vary by context,
historical moment, and geographic locale,296 individuals in the United
States believe that they can accurately identify race, and they act upon
this assumption by, for example, describing individuals by race or en-
gaging in racially discriminatory acts.
Observer-identified race, to be sure, plays a central role in racial
discrimination.  Therefore, racial pragmatist reasoning from the sus-
pect identification context can be useful in biomedical research: sev-
eral studies have shown that the health disparities observed among
minority populations can be linked to stress caused by discrimination
295 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
296 See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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based upon the perceptible combination of characteristics that have
historically been ascribed to certain groups.297  Thus, depending on the
hypothesis under investigation, scientists may be better served by
utilizing closed, rather than open-ended, racial designations, guided
loosely by the Directive No. 15 categories.  In so doing, researchers
should disclose clearly the racial category options made available to
the study participants.
Moreover, while open-ended racial designations allow individuals
to more accurately express their personal understanding of their racial
identity, the increased (though imperfect) definitional clarity provided
by a closed racial designation will enable researchers to more effec-
tively build and rely upon the data produced by others.  This practice
obviously requires race-conscious decisionmaking by regulators.
However, here, as in the criminal suspect identification context, race
appropriately correlates with or describes some underlying social real-
ity.  As a result, this use of race in the biomedical research context
should not lead to the type of stigmatizing and stereotyping that raises
constitutional concerns and leads to bad science.
3. Race as Additional Factor
To the extent that the challenge for researchers and clinicians is
to understand and evaluate disease onset, progression, and severity, as
well as to determine causality in drug efficacy and therapy response,
using race, along with any number of other variables in research, may
provide a more nuanced understanding of the effects of racism and
racial discrimination on health and therapy response.  Indeed, because
researchers may not know whether a particular health outcome can be
attributed primarily to environment, culture, or the social conse-
quences of race, they should measure for each factor.
As recognized in the voting rights and criminal suspect identifica-
tion contexts, race operates as an independent variable that is irreduc-
ible to other factors.  The state, therefore, must enable researchers to
consider race as one among other measurable variables that may im-
pact health outcomes, such as family health history, income, age, envi-
ronment, gender, education, or diet.  Conversely, focusing on race
alone may occlude other social, cultural, environmental, and physio-
logical factors that can influence health outcome.  As in the voting
rights and suspect identification contexts, race should not be the “pre-
297 See supra notes 279–84 and accompanying text.
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dominant” factor in the analysis298 and should be employed in accor-
dance with “customary” or “traditional” research principles.299
Current FDA rules require researchers conducting Phase III
clinical trials to look for possible variations in treatment responses
among different groups.300  These rules, however, offer little additional
guidance.  If a statistically significant link is found between race and
treatment response or between race and a particular condition or dis-
ease, researchers should be encouraged to engage in further study on
the racial population at issue—but they must not be permitted to as-
sume that the noted distinction is necessarily genetic.  Rather, federal
rules should mandate the use of additional research methods, such as
genetic testing, if appropriate, instead of permitting reliance upon race
as a surrogate for genetics or other factors, or allowing researchers to
impute their prejudices, biases, or financial considerations into sci-
ence.  This will enable the research community to identify the effects
of race on health without abstracting particular traits or characteristics
that individuals in each racial group are presumed to possess, which
may lead to the reinforcement or creation of invidious racial
stereotypes.
CONCLUSION
The NIH Revitalization Act and FDA rules were enacted to ad-
dress the effects of past, institutionalized racial discrimination in
clinical research.  Today, however, they are often employed in ways
that harm minority populations and reinforce pejorative biogenetic
notions of racial difference.  The assumptions of biomedical research-
ers that allow for the linking of race to genetics can be traced back to
the very origin of race in research as scientists today employ racial
categories in their studies in ways reminiscent of the early “race scien-
tists.”301  Race consciousness on the part of regulators and lawmakers
is, therefore, necessary to curtail the current misuses and to address
the effects of past abuses of race in biomedical clinical research.
Lawmakers and regulators, however, must proceed with care lest their
actions allow for the geneticization of race.
While some legal commentators have argued that federal regula-
tions and research funding guidelines should preclude researchers
298 See supra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.
299 See supra note 202–03, 205 and accompanying text.
300 See POLICY STATEMENT ON INCLUSION OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN DHHS DATA COL-
LECTION ACTIVITIES, supra note 59.
301 See supra Part I.A.
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from using racial categories in their studies, this Article argues that
federal regulations must allow for the use of racial categories in bi-
omedical studies.  However, they must do so in a way that does not
allow researchers to jeopardize individual and public health or reify
outmoded, pejorative, and stigmatizing notions of racial distinctions.
This Article demonstrates the ways in which the racial pragmatist rea-
soning identified in federal courts’ equal protection jurisprudence can
enable regulators to effectively protect public health, promote racial
justice, and restore scientific integrity by improving the way research-
ers employ racial categories in biomedical research.  Indeed, applica-
tion of racial pragmatist reasoning in the biomedical research context
challenges scientists to spend as much time elaborating on their use of
race in their studies as they spend on their datasets and regressions.
This would preclude them from conflating phenotype with genotype
or using race as a surrogate for disease and a stand-in for unexplained
processes in the formulation of targeted medical treatments.
Moreover, while addressing the current abuses of race in bi-
omedical studies, these guidelines, informed by racial pragmatist con-
siderations, also would enable the biomedical research community to
produce scientific data that could be used by health officials to deter-
mine and thereby alleviate the true causes of the disparate health out-
comes that exist among racial groups.  Further, this racial pragmatist
framework empowers government to engage in the kind of race-con-
scious decisionmaking necessary to ameliorate the effects of past and
ongoing racial discrimination, without creating racial classifications
that offend the Constitution and trigger strict scrutiny review.  This is
the racial pragmatist imperative, because, as Justice O’Connor so
aptly acknowledged, “race unfortunately still matters.”302
302 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
